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This paper characterizes heterogeneity of the beliefs of American households about future stock market
returns, provides an explanation for that heterogeneity and establishes its relationship to stock holding
behavior. We find substantial belief heterogeneity that is puzzling since households can observe the
same publicly available information about the stock market. We propose a simple learning model where
agents can invest in the acquisition of financial knowledge. Differential incentives to learn about the
returns process can explain heterogeneity in beliefs. We check this explanation by using data on beliefs
elicited as subjective probabilities and a rich set of other variables from the Health and Retirement
Study. Both descriptive statistics and estimated relevant heterogeneity of the structural parameters
provide support for our explanation. People with higher lifetime earnings, higher education, higher
cognitive abilities, defined contribution as opposed to defined benefit pension plans, for example,
possess beliefs that are considerably closer to what historical time series would imply. Our results
also suggest that a substantial part of the reduced form relationship between stock holding and household
characteristics is due to differences in beliefs. Our methodological contribution is estimating relevant
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Beliefs about stock market returns are important determinants of households￿investment
behavior. Recent research has established the strong relationship between beliefs and stock-
holding, and it also documented substantial heterogeneity in those beliefs (Vissing-Jorgensen,
2004; Dominitz and Manski, 2005 and 2007; Amromin and Sharpe, 2006). This heterogeneity
is puzzling since stock returns are publicly observable, and all of its history as well as many
analyses are public information. Understanding the source of heterogeneity is important to
understand heterogeneity in household ￿nances, which is substantial (Campbell, 2006).
The goal of this paper is to characterize heterogeneity of the stock market beliefs of
American households, understand the sources of that heterogeneity, and establish its rela-
tion to household portfolios. Our substantive contribution is to provide a more systematic
account of the heterogeneity than the previous literature and relate it to a relatively simple
explanation. Our methodological contribution is to estimate structural belief parameters
from noisy survey answers to probability questions of the type advocated by Manski (2004).
We hypothesize that heterogeneity is the result of di⁄erences in learning histories, which
are in turn caused by di⁄erences in returns to and costs of learning (as well as in initial
conditions). People learn about ￿nance in general and the stochastic process of stock market
returns in particular. The value of learning is proportional to savings, but the costs are ￿xed.
As a result, people with higher earnings prospects should learn more than people with lower
income prospects, especially if social security provides enough retirement income for the
latter. Di⁄erences in the costs of learning and di⁄erences in general attitudes may also
be heterogenous, creating additional heterogeneity in learning outcomes. Initial conditions
matter, too. Those with very low expectations will be less likely to learn and will see
their beliefs unchanged. In the end, those who learn will revise their initial beliefs to be
more precise, closer to what historical series would imply, and learning makes beliefs less
heterogenous. This is a human capital explanation applied to ￿nancial knowledge (as in
Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis, 2008). It is also an application of the information choice
theory of Veldkamp (2011).
We characterize beliefs by the subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the
one year ahead log return on the stock market index. These are unobserved variables that we
relate to observed answers to two survey questions: one about the probability that the stock
1market return would be positive and the other one about the probability that the returns
would be 10 per cent or more. Our structural estimation model accounts for survey response
error due to rounding, potential inattention, and the unwillingness or inability to make the
necessary e⁄ort to give precise answers. A subset of the respondents in our sample answered
the same pair of questions twice in the survey, about half an hour apart, which allows us to
calibrate the moments of survey noise in a direct way.
We verify the implications of the learning theory by empirical evidence on stock market
beliefs using a sample of 55 to 64 years old respondents of the Health and Retirement Study.
Our sample consists of people who are at the peak of their asset accumulation process, and
their beliefs and household portfolios are the result of their learning and investment his-
tory. We ￿rst show correlations and OLS regressions using observable answers to probability
questions. Then we estimate the structural econometric model and estimate the theoret-
ically interesting belief parameters conditional on the survey answers (analogously to the
prediction of individual risk tolerance by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2009). Our structural
model separates survey noise from relevant heterogeneity.
Our estimates show that respondents have low expectations and high perceived risk on
average and substantial heterogeneity in expectations. Results from both the simple and
the more structural analysis support the learning explanation. People who had stronger
incentives to learn in the past indeed possess beliefs that are consistent with more learning. In
particular, people with higher lifetime earnings, higher education, higher cognitive abilities,
de￿ned contribution as opposed to de￿ned bene￿t pension plans, and those who are more
optimistic and less uncertain about things in general have stock market beliefs that are less
heterogeneous, somewhat less uncertain and considerably closer in levels to what historical
time series would imply. Our results also show that the people who did not have incentives
to learn are very pessimistic about stock market returns.
On top of the small literature on beliefs, many papers have looked at reduced-form asso-
ciations of stock market participation with demography, education and wealth (Ameriks and
Zeldes, 2004; Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2002), cognitive capacity (Christelis, Jappelli
and Padula, 2010), health (Rosen and Wu, 2003), or social interactions (Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales, 2004; Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004). The results of our theoretical explana-
tion and our empirical investigation are all in line with the results of that literature. They
also suggest that part of those reduced form associations may operate through di⁄erential
2incentives for learning about attainable stock returns.
The rest of the paper is structured the following way. Section 2 contains a brief charac-
terization of stock market beliefs. Section 3 summarizes the setup and the most important
implications of a simple theoretical model of household portfolio choices with learning. We
then describe our data as brie￿ y as possible in Section 4, and move on to descriptive evi-
dence on the probability answers themselves in Section 5. Section 6 covers the estimation
of the structural parameters of beliefs and their association with stockholding and the right
hand-side variables. The last part concludes. Four appendices present the details of our
investigation. Appendix A contains the formal structure of our theoretical model and its
results. Appendix B shows more details of our data, descriptive statistics and results from
linear regressions on observables. Appendix C contains the details of the structural estima-
tion model, and Appendix D contains detailed estimation results and robustness checks.
2 Characterizing stock market beliefs
We assume that people believe that yearly log returns are i.i.d. and normally distributed.
Throughout the paper we denote the mean of log returns as ￿ and the standard deviation
as ￿. For example, ￿ = 0:1 means that the mean return is approximately ten per cent. At
yearly frequency, the i.i.d. normal assumption for log returns lines up well with historical
data available respondents to the 2002 wave of the survey we analyze. In the period of 1945
to 2002, yearly log nominal returns of the Dow Jones index were characterized by a mean of
￿ = 0:07 and a standard deviation of ￿ = 0:15. Di⁄erent windows can give lower and higher
values of ￿, and the value of ￿ is remarkably stable.
Under the i.i.d. lognormality assumption, the beliefs of individual i about the stock mar-
ket returns are fully characterized by her beliefs about the mean and the standard deviation,
and we denote those subjective beliefs by ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i. We de￿ne ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i as the parameters
that would characterize individual beliefs in investment situations. The goal of this paper
is to characterize heterogeneity in ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i , understand the sources of that heterogeneity,
and establish its relationship to heterogeneity in household portfolios.
~ ￿i and ~ ￿i are unobserved in our data. Instead, we observe answers to probability ques-
tions. In the larger part of the sample that we use to show descriptive statistics, one question
was asked. This question (p0) asked what the respondent thought the probability is that the
3market will go up. In the sample that we use for the structural analysis, we have answers to
another probability question as well (p10), about the probability that the market will go up
by at least 10 per cent. The questions themselves were phrased the following way.
p0 question: By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares
invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be worth more than
they are today?
p10 question: By next year at this time, what is the chance they will have grown by 10 percent
or more? 1
When answers to both p0 and p10 are available, identifying the mean and standard devia-
tion of log returns from the two probabilities is relatively straightforward under the normality
assumption. Let R denote one year ahead gross returns, which is a random variable with
lnR ￿ N (￿;￿2). In principle, one can relate these probabilities to the parameters of the
lognormal distribution in a straightforward way. Let heterogeneity be denoted by an i in-
dex, the subjective nature of the probabilities by the tilde, and let stars denote theoretically
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0i and ~ p￿
10i would allow for a simple computation of ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i by making use
of the inverse normal c.d.f. Higher ~ ￿i corresponds to higher probabilities, while higher ~ ￿i
pushes the argument of ￿ toward zero and thus pushes both probabilities towards 0:5.
In order to see the correspondence between ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i on the one hand and ~ p￿
0i and ~ p￿
10i
on the other hand in more intuitive ways, Figure 1 shows three probability distribution
functions together with vertical lines at the cuto⁄ points of 0 and 0.1 log returns that
correspond to the p0 and p10 questions. The continuous line shows a p.d.f. with historical
1Note that the wording of the questions ("will be worth more") is somewhat vague. We interpret it as
nominal returns without taking in￿ ation, taxes or investment costs into consideration. If ￿nancially more
sophisticated people have higher and more precise expectations, and, at the same time, they are more likely
to think in real and/or after-tax terms, we shall underestimate heterogeneity in beliefs and its relation to
variables that are related to ￿nancial sophistication.
4moments between 1945 and 2002 ( ￿ = 0:07 and ￿ = 0:15). The dashed line corresponds to
a mean-preserving spread (higher perceived risk), and the dotted line corresponds to a lower
mean (more pessimistic beliefs).
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Figure 1. Examples for probability densities of normally distributed log returns, with the
cuto⁄ points for p0 and p10
~ p￿
0i and ~ p￿
10i are equal to the area to the right of the corresponding bars at 0 and 0:1
log returns, respectively. The series of post-war returns to 2002 corresponds to p￿
0 = 0:68,
p￿
10 = 0:42 and p￿
0 ￿ p￿
10 = 0:26.
Holding risk constant, more pessimistic beliefs result in smaller values of ~ p￿
0i and ~ p￿
10i. We
can therefore think of the answer to the p0 (or the p10) questions as proxy variables for the
perceived level of returns. A mean-preserving spread leads to smaller area between the two
vertical bars, which equals the di⁄erence ~ p￿
0i ￿ ~ p￿
10i. The di⁄erence between the two answers
may thus serve as a proxy for the inverse of perceived risks.
These proxies are not clean, though. The e⁄ect of risk on the probabilities can be am-
biguous: higher risk corresponds to a smaller area to the right of a cuto⁄ point if the mean
is to the right (as for cuto⁄ 0 when comparing the solid and the dashed curves), but it cor-
responds to a larger area if the mean is to the left (as for cuto⁄ 0:1). Optimism/pessimism
a⁄ects the di⁄erence between the probabilities, too, in ambiguous ways. For example, opti-
mism decreases the di⁄erence if the mean is shifted outside the interval between the two bars
5from within the bars (as is the case for the dotted curve here), but the e⁄ect is the opposite
if the mean is shifted towards to the middle of the interval. Simultaneous heterogeneity in
the mean and the variance can lead to more complicated heterogeneity in the level and the
di⁄erence of ~ p￿
0i and ~ p￿
10i.
Observing ~ p￿
0i and ~ p￿
10i would identify ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i at the individual level. Instead of ~ p￿
0i and
~ p￿
10i, however, we are likely to observe something else, as answers to the probability questions
contain substantial noise with a complicated structure.
~ ￿i and ~ ￿i are the parameters that are relevant in investment situations. There are, how-
ever, strong theoretical reasons to believe that people￿ s answers to the probability questions
are not equal to the p￿ transformations of these parameters. There is little time to answer
the questions, and, beyond a spirit of cooperation, there are no incentives to get the answers
right. It is therefore better to look at actual answers as "guesses" for what the p￿ values
may be, given recollections of ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i.
The data reveals answer patterns that strongly support this view, and we shall document
that later. Some of these answer patterns make computing the p￿ values impossible. All
of the answer patterns indicate that actual answers are noisy transformations of relevant
beliefs. Our structural econometric model will address these problems.
3 Heterogeneity in beliefs and learning
In this section we brie￿ y summarize the explanation we propose for the heterogeneity in
stock market beliefs. It is in the spirit of the human capital literature and its application to
￿nancial knowledge (as in Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis, 2008), embedded in a standard
life-cycle model with borrowing constraints. It can also be viewed as an application of the
information choice theory of Veldkamp (2011). Appendix A contains a formal model, its
numerical solution and its most important comparative static results.
Heterogeneity in stock market beliefs is the result of di⁄erences in learning histories,
which di⁄erences are in turn caused by di⁄erences in returns to and costs of learning (and,
potentially, di⁄erences in initial conditions). Suppose that individuals live for three periods:
young adulthood, mature adulthood and old age. Young people are endowed with some
initial sets of beliefs about the mean and the standard deviation of log returns (~ ￿ and ~ ￿),
and they share the belief that returns are i.i.d. lognormal.
6In young adulthood, people work, earn wages, consume and save, but are subject to
borrowing constraints. Mature adults look the same except that wages are considerably
higher. In old age, people receive pension bene￿ts and earn no wage. Importantly, pensions
are from a de￿ned-bene￿t system such as Social Security, and pension bene￿ts are a concave
function of lifetime earnings. As a result, people who earn below a certain threshold do not
have an incentive to save for retirement, people who earn above that threshold do save, and
their saving rate depends on their lifetime earnings. Savings can be held in risk-free bank
accounts or invested in risky stocks. Borrowing and short sales are not allowed, making
the share of stocks in per period savings between zero and one. The returns on stocks are
governed by the i.i.d. lognormal process with historical moments, regardless of individuals￿
beliefs. But whether and how much an individual chooses to invest into stocks in any period
depends on her beliefs about those moments at the beginning of the period.
The essence of the model is the possibility to learn about the parameters of the returns
process. Learning is the result of a choice. If people choose to learn, they can observe a
long historical series of log returns and update their subjective beliefs in a standard Bayesian
fashion. The results are a posterior mean that is closer to the historical average and a smaller
posterior variance. Learning is more general than updating beliefs: it is understanding the
ways in which investment works. As a result, earning can increase the attainable expected
return and/or reduce the risk of their portfolio on top of the e⁄ects of learning on beliefs
about stock market returns. If they choose to learn, people have to pay a ￿xed cost. People
may also learn in a more passive fashion: If they have high enough earnings in young age,
they may invest those into stocks, and observing the returns will allow for updating beliefs.
The implications of this model are straightforward. The value of learning is proportional
to intended savings, but the costs are ￿xed. Those who have higher lifetime earnings or lower
learning costs will be more likely to learn. Similarly, if we allow for heterogeneity in initial
belief endowments, higher initial subjective mean and lower initial variance will also lead
to higher propensity to learn. Higher risk tolerance and more patience also lead to higher
propensity to learn.
These results have important implications for the empirical analysis of heterogeneous
stock market beliefs and household portfolios. Heterogeneity in lifetime earnings re￿ ects
heterogeneity in general human capital which, in turn, is the result of di⁄erences in the costs
of and the bene￿ts to investment based on probability beliefs about future returns. (Becker,
71964,1993; Willis, 1986; Card, 1998). If stock market beliefs are result of investment into
a speci￿c form of human capital, all personal characteristics that are related to lifetime
earnings will also be related to beliefs as well, even conditional on lifetime earnings. This
is another channel through which earnings and household ￿nances are related, on top of
the more traditional argument for the role of background risk (emphasized by, e.g., Viceira,
2001).
4 Data
In this section we give a brief overview of our sample and discuss the de￿nition of the variables
we use in the analysis. The Appendix B contains additional information; ￿gures and tables
in the Appendix B are labeled as B1, B2 etc.
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a large biannual panel house-
hold survey that follows older Americans (see NIA, 2007, for review). The HRS is representa-
tive of the American population 50 years of age or older, and their households. HRS has had
a number of probability questions from 1992 on. It added questions on stock market beliefs
in 2002. Besides subjective probabilities, HRS collects data on the amount and structure of
savings, including tax-sheltered accounts such as 401(k), a rich set of demographic variables,
and measures of cognitive functioning. In addition, retrospective earnings data from W2 tax
forms are linked to a large subset of the HRS respondents for long time periods (the latter
data are available in a secure data use setting). For the descriptive analysis in this paper,
we use data from four waves of HRS, from 2002 through 20082; for the structural analysis
we use data from 2002 only.
We restricted the sample to people who were 55 to 64 years of age and whose spouse
was also in that age range. The age restriction has both a theoretical and a practical
reason. Households in this age group are around the end of the wealth accumulation phase
of the life cycle but have not yet started decumulating their wealth. The cross-section of
these households allows us to analyze heterogeneity in the results of learning and investment
histories. The practical reason for the age restriction is the availability of retrospective
2Hudomiet, KØzdi and Willis (2011) show that shortly after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September
2008 stock market beliefs of households changed substantially and in an unusual way. For this reason we
decided to drop interviews that were made after September 2008 in this paper.
8earnings data from administrative sources, an important variable in the analysis. Sample
sizes are in table B1 in the Appendix B.
In 2002, the HRS asked the p0 and the p10 questions, while in 2004 and 2006 only the
p0 questions. In 2008, the p0 question was accompanied by a second question with eight
randomized threshold values ranging from a decrease of 40 per cent or more to and increase
of 40 per cent or more. Hudomiet, KØzdi and Willis (2011) use these probability variables
from HRS 2008 to look at the e⁄ect of the crash of the stock market on households￿beliefs.
In this paper we use answers to the p0 questions from all four survey waves and the p10
question from 2002.3
The 2002 wave of the HRS includes an "experimental module" with additional subjective
probability questions about stock market returns. About ￿ve per cent of the respondents
were randomly assigned to answer the questions in this module. Among others, the module
included questions on p0 and p10 once more. Typically, people answered the experimen-
tal module about 30 minutes and 60 questions after they answered the original p0 and p10
questions. This small subsample allows for a direct analysis of measurement error in the
probability answers, in the spirit of the test-retest reliability studies in the survey measure-
ment literature.
Stockholding is measured at the level of households. In the HRS households are asked
whether they had investments in stocks or mutual funds. If ￿yes,￿we call people in these
households ￿stockholders outside retirement accounts￿ . The survey asks about retirement
accounts as well and the fraction of stocks in those (the latter in a simpli￿ed way until 2006).
Persons who lived in households in which someone had stocks or mutual fund investments in
retirement accounts are labelled ￿stockholders in retirement accounts.￿The union of these
two sets is labelled ￿stockholders.￿
The fraction of stockholders is 51 per cent in 2002. Conditional on stockholding, the share
of stocks in portfolios held outside retirement accounts is 59 per cent, and it is 80 per cent
on retirement accounts. Stockholding status declines between 2002 and 2008 and so does
the fraction of stocks in the portfolio conditional on stockholding. The likelihood of being a
stockholder increases in wealth (both total net wealth and ￿nancial wealth). Conditional on
stockholding, the share of stocks in the portfolio seems unrelated to wealth. Tables B2 and
3The varying thresholds for the second probability question in HRS 2008 introduce econometric compli-
cations that we do not address in this paper.
9B3 and ￿gures B1 through B4 in the Appendix B show the details.
One of the most important variables is a proxy of lifetime earnings. The variable is
de￿ned as the cpi-adjusted mean earnings of households with individuals between age 40 and
55 based on the W-2 tax forms. The variable is from con￿dential data and is not available
for part of the sample, which needed imputed values. Other right hand-side variables include
standard demographics (age, gender, single or couple, years of education race and ethnicity)
and wealth (measured in categories, separately for total net wealth and ￿nancial wealth).
Cognitive functioning is measured by the four short tests included in HRS (immediate
word recall, delayed word recall, serial 7s (successively subtracting seven from one hundred)
and dementia screening questions). We use the ￿rst factor of the four aggregate scores for
each individual between 1992 and 2000. McArdle, Fisher and Kadlec (2007) argue that the
￿rst factor of these tests measures episodic memory.
We use three measures for general optimism/pessimism and one measure for general
uncertainty as personal attitudes. Each of these measures is based on survey answers prior
to the 2002 wave of the HRS. The ￿rst optimism variable is a dummy denoting positive
errors in predicting sunny weather. HRS 1994 and 2000 included a "warm-up" question to
the series of subjective probability questions about the probability that the day following the
interview would be sunny. We obtained realized weather data for the day in question at the
zip-code location of the interview, and we regressed the probability answer on sunny hours
(their fraction to hours of daylight). The residual of this regression can be interpreted as a
forecast error. The variable we use is a dummy indicating whether the respondent￿ s average
forecast error was positive on both of the two surveys. The use of the answers to the HRS
sunshine question as a measure of optimism was ￿rst proposed by Basset and Lumsdaine
(1999).
The second optimism variable is the individual￿ s assessment of the likelihood that a
major recession would occur the near future. The question was asked in HRS 1992, 1996
and 1998, and the measure we use is the average of those answers. This variable appears
in the survey well before the stock market answers and is likely to re￿ ect general pessimism
about the economy. The third variable is a score created from the nine-item psychological
depression tests administered to the respondents in all waves of the HRS between 1992 and
2000. This test lists symptoms of psychological depression, and we use the score as a measure
of time-invariant general pessimism.
10The measure for general uncertainty is the fraction of ￿fty per cent answers to all proba-
bility questions (except for the stock market questions) given by the individual in all of the
surveys from year 1992 to 2002. The idea behind this measure is that a person￿ s propen-
sity to give 50-50 answers in many di⁄erent domains indicates uncertainty in general. This
variable is very similar to the one used in Hill, Perry and Willis (2005) and Sahm (2007).
The right hand-side variables include a proxy for risk tolerance for HRS respondents
estimated by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008) from answers to hypothetical gambles over
lifetime earnings in HRS 1992 to 2002. Using these measures, Sahm (2007) found a signi￿cant
positive relationship between risk tolerance and stockholding in a larger sample of HRS
respondents.
5 Descriptive analysis
Before turning to a more structural analysis, we show results from descriptive statistics and
simple linear regressions using the answers to the probability questions. We ￿rst document
survey noise in the probability answers; then we characterize observed heterogeneity in those
answers; ￿nally, we show that the probability answers predict stockholding in ways that are
consistent with portfolio choice theory.
The answers to the stock market probability questions contain substantial noise. Tables
B2 through B4 through B10 and ￿gure B5 in the Appendix B show the detailed statistics.
95 per cent of the p0 answers are rounded to ten or 25 or 75 per cent. Focal values at
50 per cent account for an especially large part of all answers. In the American context, the
answer "￿fty-￿fty" to such a probability question may be interpreted as a synonym for "I
don￿ t know."4 At the same time, 50 per cent is a frequent response to probability questions in
Europe as well (Hurd, Rohwedder and Winter, 2005). The rounding in p0 and p10 is typical
for survey probability answers; see Manski (2004) for examples.
Many respondents give the same answer to p0 and p10 that, taken at face value, would
4Beginning in 2006, HRS has asked a follow-up question to respondents who answer the p0 question with
an answer of ￿50￿to distinguish between those who believe that the stock market is equally likely to go
up or down in the coming year from those who are ￿just unsure￿about the probability. About two-thirds
answer that they are unsure. See Bruine de Bruin and Carman (2011) for a more detailed analysis of the 50
per cent responses.
11imply in￿nitely large standard deviations of log returns. Rounding would allow for ￿nite (but
large) standard deviations to give that pattern. Some respondents give p0 < p10; which does
not conform the laws of probability. It may be that these respondents do not understand
probabilities at all. It is also possible that these answers re￿ ect inattention to one or both
questions. Empirical evidence is in line with the latter interpretation.
The most direct evidence on survey noise comes from comparing answers to the p0 and
p10 questions in the core questionnaire and the experimental module. When the randomly
selected small subset of the respondents were asked to answer the same probability questions
once again during the same interview about half hour later, most gave di⁄erent answers.
Perhaps surprisingly, all three noise features (rounding, apparent violations of the laws
of probability, and test-retest noise) seem largely random (see tables B6 through B10 in
the appendix). The prevalence of these answer patterns are not related to stockholding or
cognitive capacity. There are some weak associations between rounding and education, and
the propensity to give the same answer to p0 and p10 and education, lifetime earnings and
wealth. Some demographic characteristics are also weakly predictive but no clear pattern
emerges. The cross-sectional distribution of the probability answers in the experimental
module is very similar to the cross-sectional distribution of the probability answers in the
core questionnaire. The absolute di⁄erence between the core and module answers is unrelated
to any observable variable.
Having established noise in the probability answers, we turn to relevant heterogeneity in
them. The goal is to show variation in the probability answers across groups of respondents
that, according to our argument, should have had di⁄erent incentives for learning and thus
should have di⁄erent beliefs.
We focus on four statistics: the sample average of p0 (￿ p0); the variance of p0 in the sample
(V (p0i)), the average di⁄erence between p0 and p10 (￿ p0 ￿ ￿ p10) and the fraction of missing p0
answers. These statistics are computed using waves 2002 through 2008 of HRS, except for
(￿ p0 ￿ ￿ p10), which is computed for 2002 only as p10 is not available in later years.
￿ p0 can be thought of as a proxy for the mean level of stock market beliefs: higher values
correspond to more optimistic beliefs, and the closer ￿ p0 is to 0.68 (or 0.61 for more recent
years before 2002) the closer the level of beliefs is to what historical returns would imply.
V (p0i) is a measure of cross-sectional heterogeneity in expected stock returns, also called
disagreement in the ￿nance literature (Hong and Stein, 2007). (￿ p0 ￿ ￿ p10) is an inverse proxy
12for perceived risk: the larger the di⁄erence the lower risk is attributed to stock returns. The
fraction of missing p0 answers is a proxy for ignorance, which can be thought of as extreme
uncertainty about stock returns.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics by lifetime earnings, father￿ s occupation, educa-
tion, cognitive capacity, risk tolerance and stockholding status. Those with higher lifetime
earnings, education and cognitive capacity should have beliefs that re￿ ect past learning be-
cause of stronger incentives to learn actively, both through its costs and bene￿ts. De￿ned
contribution (DC) pensions create higher incentives for learning than de￿ned bene￿t (DB)
pensions. Those with fathers who were managers or professionals grew up in families that
were more likely to be exposed to stockholding or had higher levels of ￿nancial knowledge.
Father￿ s occupation is, of course, related to lifetime earnings as well, through intergenera-
tional income links. Risk tolerance is also likely to be related to stock market beliefs both
through passive learning (higher levels of risk tolerance lead to stockholding at least in case
of favorable beliefs) and active learning (by increasing expected bene￿ts). Finally, those who
hold stocks towards the end of their active career have stock market beliefs that re￿ ect past
learning; either passive learning through earlier stockholding or active learning.
Learning should lead to beliefs that are characterized by levels closer to historical average,
lower perceived risk, lower levels of ignorance. In addition, groups whose members learned
more should be characterized by lower levels of disagreement. Translated to the proxy
variables in Table 1, these would imply ￿ p0 closer to 0.68, lower V (p0i), higher ￿ p0 ￿ ￿ p10 (and
closer to 0.26) and lower fraction of missing p0 answers.
13Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the subjective probability answers to the
stock market returns questions. HRS 2002 through 2008.
￿ p0 V (p0i) ￿ p0 ￿ ￿ p10 Fraction missing p0
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:56 0:067 0:113 0:03
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:44 0:079 0:061 0:26
Education college or more 0:56 0:062 0:123 0:06
Education high school or less 0:45 0:074 0:062 0:23
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:60 0:059 0:148 0:02
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:55 0:064 0:137 0:03
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:53 0:063 0:116 011
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:42 0:082 0:053 0:31
Father was manager or professional 0:55 0:064 0:109 0:10
Father had other occupation 0:50 0:072 0:084 0:15
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:51 0:070 0:095 0:16
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:45 0:078 0:073 0:16
Stockholder 0:55 0:063 0:107 0:06
Not stockholder 0:45 0:074 0:063 0:24
Entire sample 0:50 0:071 0:086 0:16
Total number of observations 11;259 11;259 3;532 13;408
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, waves 2002, 4, 6 and 8 (￿ p0 ￿ ￿ p10 is from HRS 2002 only).
Respondents of age 55 through 64 with a spouse of the same age range (and singles)
p0 is the answer to the probability of positive returns on stock markets by following year
The results are all consistent with the predictions of the learning model. Individuals with
high lifetime earnings, DC pension plans, high levels of education, high cognitive capacity,
high risk tolerance or who grew up in families that were exposed to stockholding (more likely
if the father was manager or professional) have beliefs that re￿ ect learning more than the
beliefs of their complementary groups (non-stockholders, those with low lifetime earnings,
DB pensions, low education, low cognitive capacity, low risk tolerance, non-managerial or
non-professional father). Their beliefs are closer to historical probabilities, which also means
more optimistic beliefs and lower perceived risk. There is less disagreement about stock
returns in these groups, and there is less ignorance measured by the prevalence of missing
14answers.
The ￿gures also imply that expectations are low, disagreement is substantial and per-
ceived risks are high. Note however that the probability answers match historical frequencies
well in combined groups for whom learning incentives should be the highest. College edu-
cated people with top 25 per cent lifetime earnings and DC pension plans have an average p0
of 0:64; average p0 ￿p10 at 0:17, zero per cent missing answers and very little disagreement.
Nevertheless, low expectations and high perceived risk among the general population, and
among non-stockholders in particular, is remarkable.
Table B11 in the Appendix B shows substantial variation of beliefs by the year of in-
terview. Interestingly, average beliefs of stockholders exhibit remarkable stability over the
years, and much of the cross-year variation is due to non-stockholders. The same is true for
missing probability answers. Conversely, much of the cross-year variation in disagreement
comes from stockholders.
OLS regressions reveal partial correlations that are very similar to the simple inter-group
di⁄erences in Table 1 above (see table B12 in the Appendix B). The belief-speci￿c right hand-
side variables predict stock market probabilities in expected ways, too. Sunshine optimism is
positively related to the level of p0 answers, while past beliefs about economic recession and
depressive symptoms are negatively related. The propensity to have given ￿fty-￿fty answers
in the past is strongly negatively related to the di⁄erence between p0 and p10, indicating
strong positive correlation with perceived stock market risk. There are strong di⁄erences
among demographic groups as well, even after holding the other variables constant. Women,
singles and African Americans give probability answers that indicate more pessimistic beliefs,
higher perceived risks, and they and Hispanics are more likely to give missing answers.
The probability answers predict stockholding, as documented by OLS regressions in table
B13 of the Appendix B. We estimated two separate linear regressions for stockholding, one for
the probability of nonzero stock-market based assets in the household portfolio, Pr(si > 0)
and one for the share of such assets if nonzero E [sijsi > 0]. The two types of regressions
allow for looking at the relation of beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin and the
intensive margin separately. This speci￿cation does not "handle" selection into stockholding
but it is the simplest way to look at the two margins.5 For each left hand-side variable,
5Credible identi￿cation of a selection model would require exlcusion restrictions in the second regression,
i.e. instruments that a⁄ect stockholding at the extensive margin but not the intensive margin. In principle,
15we estimated one regression on the entire sample (with the appropriate age restriction) that
includes p0i and the dummy for missing p0i, and another one on the HRS 2002 sample that
includes p0i ￿ p10i.
The results are all consistent with the role of beliefs in portfolio choice. Stockholding
is strongly positively related to p0 answers, negatively related to the propensity to give a
missing p0 answer, and it is positively related to p0 ￿ p10, indicating a negative relation
to perceived risk. Conditional on stockholding, the fraction of stock-market based assets
in household portfolios are positively related to p0 answers and p0 ￿ p10, the latter again
indicating a negative correlation with perceived risk. These results are strong because they
are conditional on lifetime earnings, education, cognitive capacity and demographics. The
results at the intensive margin are all the more remarkable because only beliefs and education
have signi￿cant coe¢ cients. Controlling for detailed measures of household wealth decreases
the coe¢ cients by half, but most remain signi￿cant. Wealth in this age group is endogenous
as it is the result of savings and investment history, and thus these latter results are likely
biased downward in magnitude.
The descriptive statistics and the linear regression results are consistent with the hypothe-
sis that stock market beliefs are results of learning over the lifetime and predict stockholding.
These results are robust in the sense that they are free from additional econometric assump-
tions. At the same time, they yield estimates that are hard to interpret, for two reasons.
First, the probability answers and their simple transformations may be a⁄ected by hetero-
geneity both in the subjective mean (~ ￿) and the subjective standard deviation (~ ￿). Second,
measurement error is likely to distort the observed probability answers and thus the descrip-
tive statistics derived from them. The next section presents a more structural measurement
model that deals with these problems.
6 Structural analysis
We develop a structural measurement model to estimate heterogeneity in the relevant belief
variables and handle survey noise. The model relates the latent belief variables (~ ￿i; ~ ￿i) to
one would need variation in ￿xed costs that is exogenous to anything that a⁄ects investment choices that
lead to variation in the fraction of stocks. We argue that ￿xed costs are mostly related to learning, the
results of which naturally a⁄ect all investment choices. Valid instruments are thus hard to ￿nd in this case.
16the observed answers to the probability questions (p0i;p10i). It accommodates the observed
noise features in the data and our intuition about the way people answer di¢ cult survey
questions.
Our estimation strategy is structural in the sense that it focuses on the theoretically
relevant parameters and the relevant heterogeneity in those parameters (net of survey noise).
In particular, we estimate the moments of the distribution of ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i in the population
and in various subpopulations (analogously to Table 1 above), and we investigate the role of
heterogeneity of ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i in heterogeneity of stockholding.
The assumption of i.i.d. normal log returns implies that individual beliefs are fully
characterized by ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i. As we noted earlier, probability judgments elicited in a survey
situation are likely to be very di⁄erent from those that enter into a real life investment
decision. The survey response to a probability question takes less than thirty seconds, on
average, and there are practically no incentives to get the answers right.6 We model the
di⁄erence in two steps. The ￿rst introduces survey noise, and the second step introduces
rounding.
Noise is modeled as mean-zero additive components to the index ~ ￿=~ ￿ that enters the
probabilities p0 and p10. The noise components, denoted by v0 and v10, are assumed to
be jointly normal and potentially correlated. Let pbr
0i and pbr
10i denote hypothetical "before
rounding" answers so that the observed answers p0i and p10i may be rounded versions of the




































The noise components are assumed to be independent of any relevant heterogeneity, which
is consistent with the randomness of the test-retest error and the near-randomness of the
6At the same time, it is important to stress that more than a half century of survey research has shown
that data from properly designed and executed sample surveys can be used to make valid inferences to
population characteristics despite short response times and lack of incentive to tell the truth (or to lie).
17other noise features. The bivariate nature of the noise accommodates answers of p0i < p10i if
that phenomenon is due to inattention on the survey (which, as noted earlier, is supported
by the near-randomness of its prevalence). The correlation coe¢ cient between v0 and v10 is
related to average inattention. ￿v = 1 would mean that all respondents answer questions p0
and p10 with the same noise, which would not allow for answers like p0i < p10i. At the other
extreme, ￿v = 0 would mean that all respondents forget their previous answers completely.
The true value of ￿v is likely to be in-between.
We identify moments of the noise process (￿2
v;￿v) by making use of answers from the
experimental module. Recall that a small subset of the respondents answered the same
probability questions once more, in an experimental module. We assume that noise com-
ponents in the core and module answers are independent.7 Comparing answers to the core
and experimental module questions identi￿es the noise variance ￿2
v. Conditional on ￿2
v, joint
moments of the p0i and p10i answers identify the correlation ￿v. The Appendix C contains
the details of identi￿cation and the calibration results. Our preferred estimates are ￿v = 0:95
and ￿v = 0:42 or 0:61 (the latter depending on whether covariates are entered or not).
Answers to the probability questions may di⁄er from the hypothetical "before-rounding"
probabilities pbr because of rounding. We accommodate rounding by an interval response
model. An answer within a pre-speci￿ed interval can correspond to any probability pbr within
that interval. Round numbers are in the middle of those intervals, which are de￿ned in an
exogenous fashion and are assumed to be the same for all respondents.
Formally, the vector of survey answers (p0i;p10i) is in the quadrant Qkl if the vector of
hypothetical probabilities pbr
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In the implemented model, the intervals are de￿ned, in percentage terms, as [0;5);
7This is probably a lower bound to the noise variance, because any "noise" that would be speci￿c to
the entire survey situation but would not a⁄ect investment decisions (e.g. the experience of a bad day)
would a⁄ect the "core" and "module" answers in similar ways and would not be measured by the test-retest
di⁄erence.
18[5;15); [15;25) ;:::; [95;100]: These intervals allow for rounding to the nearest ten. The
interval response model is the simplest way of accommodating rounding that is compatible
with the guesswork of calculating probabilities.
With additional assumptions on their cross-sectional distribution, this model allows for
estimating moments of the relevant heterogeneity in ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i. We assume that ~ ￿i is normally
distributed and ~ ￿i follows a two-point distribution. We estimate the conditional mean of
the normal distribution and the probability of the low point conditional on right hand-side
variables. In the benchmark model we estimate the variance of the normal distribution and
the high value of ~ ￿ unconditionally, and we set the low value of ~ ￿ to the historical standard
deviation of log returns. As a robustness check, we explore models in which the low value of
~ ￿ is estimated as well.
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In the equations, z￿ is the vector of optimism variables (positive error in forecasting
sunshine, low expectations about the economy in the past, symptoms of clinical depression),
z￿ is the proxy variable of person-speci￿c uncertainty (the fraction of ￿fty-￿fty answers to
all probability answers in the past), and xi denotes the vector of all other right hand-side
variables.8 ￿ stands for the constant in the equation for ~ ￿. We estimated it as a vector, by
allowing for a di⁄erent constant for ~ ￿i = ~ ￿low versus ~ ￿i = ~ ￿high, which allows for a correlation
between ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i.
We estimated the model by Maximum Likelihood. The details of the likelihood function
are in the Appendix C. We estimated the model with and without the right hand-side
variables. The details of the parameter estimates are in table D1 of the Appendix D.9
8Excluding z￿ from the equation of ~ ￿ and excluding z￿ from the equation of ~ ￿ are motivated by the fact
that they do not in￿ uence the belief proxies in the simple linear regressions (Appendix B, table B12). These
exclusions may in principle be important in identifying the association of ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i on the one hand and
stockholding on the other hand in the stockholding equations below. However, the inclusion of z￿ and z￿ in
all equations (including the stockholding equations) does not change any of the results, see the additional
estimates presented in the Online Appendix D, tables D9 through D11.
9There we show additional results for the restricted sample of ￿nancial respondents and for a more
19Table 2 shows the estimates of the most important unconditional moments of the relevant
heterogeneity in stock market beliefs.
Table 2. Relevant heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. Estimates from the structural model
Model w/o covariates Model with covariates
Point estimate SE￿ Point estimate SE￿
Population average of ~ ￿ ￿0:066 0:018 ￿0:050 0:015
Population standard deviation of ~ ￿ 0:197 0:019 0:218 0:027
Population average of ~ ￿ 0:576 0:077 0:532 0:091
￿Bootstrap standard errors
Sample: HRS 2002, 55 to 64 years old ￿nancial respondents (partner is also 55 to 64)
The results imply low expectations and high perceived risks on average and substan-
tial heterogeneity in expectations. The population moment estimates are similar whether
covariates are used or not used in the estimation, but the model with covariates indicates
somewhat less pessimistic expectations and lower perceived risk. According to the estimates
with covariates, the population average of ~ ￿i is negative 5 per cent. The population standard
deviation of ~ ￿ is 22 per cent, indicating that over 40 per cent of the population has positive
expectations, and almost 30 per cent have expectations at or above the historical average of
0:07. The population average of the perceived standard deviation is over 50 per cent, to be
compared to the historical standard deviation of 15 per cent.
Perhaps even more interesting are the moments conditional on the covariates. Instead of
interpreting the estimated coe¢ cients of the model, we show estimated moments of ~ ￿i and
~ ￿i in various groups.
The moments within subgroups are based on predicted values of ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i, which are
conditional on observed survey answers p0i and p10i and the other covariates in the estimation
model. The predicted subjective mean and subjective standard deviation are denoted by
^ ￿i and ^ ￿i, and they come from the following conditional expectations (where hats on the
expectation operator mean estimates):
￿ exible way of estimating heterogeneity in ~ ￿i. Those results are qualitatively very similar to our benchmark
esitmates, except that heterogeneity in ~ ￿i is less successfully pinned down in some cases.
20^ ￿i = b E[~ ￿ijxi;z￿i;(p0i;p10i) 2 Qkl] (9)
^ ￿i = b E[~ ￿ijxi;z￿i;(p0i;p10i) 2 Qkl] (10)
The conditional expectations are relatively straightforward to compute by Bayes￿Rule
after the results of the structural model that speci￿es the full distributions for ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i. The
predicted ^ ￿i and ^ ￿i are then the sample analogues to those. The details of the derivation
are in the Appendix C.
This prediction method is analogous to the prediction of risk tolerance based on sur-
vey answers to hypothetical gambles by Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008). The predicted
values are di⁄erent from the true values, creating measurement error in the variables. The
measurement error is one of prediction error. It has zero mean and thus leads to an unbiased
estimate of the population mean, but it leads to an underestimation of the population stan-
dard deviation (because the predicted values are less dispersed than the true values). Using
^ ￿i and ^ ￿i on the right-hand side of a regression leads to consistent estimates as long as all
the covariates that are used in the predictions are also entered in the regression in question.
The standard errors in this regression are inconsistent, though, and thus bootstrap standard
errors are advised. If one uses the ^ ￿i and ^ ￿i in regressions that have di⁄erent covariates
from the ones used in the prediction equations, OLS is inconsistent and a more sophisticated
GMM procedure is appropriate (see Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2008, for more details).
Table 3 shows the average predicted belief variables in various groups in the sample. The
table is analogous to table 1 in the descriptive analysis, except that table 3 does not have a
measure of disagreement (because that is not estimated well by the dispersion of ^ ￿i), and it
does not repeat the fraction of missing answers.
21Table 3. Estimated mean of the structural parameters of stock market beliefs
in various subpopulations. HRS 2002
Average ^ ￿i Average ^ ￿i
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:065 0:542
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings ￿0:070 0:540
Education college or more 0:041 0:539
Education high school or less ￿0:094 0:536
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:072 0:536
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:051 0:573
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:023 0:551
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity ￿0:138 0:517
Father was manager or professional 0:030 0:519
Father had other occupation ￿0:049 0:550
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:008 0:515
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance ￿0:141 0:569
Financial respondent in couple 0:031 0:512
Non-￿nancial respondent in couple ￿0:051 0:558
Entire sample ￿0:041 0:539
Total number of observations 3;314 3;314
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Respondents of age 55 through 64 (partner also 55-64)
^ ￿i and ^ ￿i: subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the one-year ahead stock return, predicted value
The inter-group di⁄erences in average expectations are large. Those with top 25 per cent
lifetime earnings or top 25 per cent cognitive capacity believe that expected stock returns
are 15 percentage points higher than those with bottom 25 per cent earnings or cognitive
capacity. College educated respondents believe that expected returns are 13 percentage
points higher than those with high school education or less. Average ^ ￿ is still below the
historical average of 0:07 in these categories, but in combined categories it exceeds that (it
is 0:11 for college educated respondents with top 25 per cent lifetime earnings and a DC
pension plan). The di⁄erences by pension plan, the father￿ s occupation, risk tolerance and
￿nancial respondent status are sometimes smaller but still substantial. These di⁄erences
are all in line with the predictions of the learning model. On average, individuals who had
22higher incentives to learn believe that expected stock market returns are positive and closer
to historical evidence than other individuals.
The estimated intergroup di⁄erences in perceived risk are smaller and do not always have
the expected direction, because our model is less successful in capturing heterogeneity in ~ ￿.
Nevertheless, in most of the cases when the di⁄erence is substantial, the results are in line
with the predictions of the learning model: those who had higher incentives to learn believe
that risks are lower and closer to historical evidence.
Finally, we examine the association of predicted individual beliefs with stockholding.
Stockholding is speci￿ed as a two-tier hurdle model. The extensive margin (whether a
household holds any stock-market based assets at all) is a probit, and the intensive margin
(how much it holds if it holds any) is a truncated regression. Subjective beliefs are entered
in the right-hand side of these equations in the form of their predicted values ^ ￿i and ^ ￿i, in
additive ways.





i = ￿2^ ￿i + ￿2^ ￿i + ￿
0
2xi + u2i (12)
We estimated both models in two ways, ￿rst without the stock market belief estimates
and second with them. Apart from the belief-speci￿c variables, the same right hand-side
variables are included in the structural model as in the stockholding equations. As a result
the coe¢ cients of the belief variables are consistently estimated (see our discussion above
and also in Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2008). Because of inconsistency of the analytical
standard errors, we present bootstrap standard errors that are re-sampled at the level of
households (in order to allow for within-household correlations that are obviously strong
because of the common left hand-side variable).
Besides the coe¢ cients of the belief variables, it is also interesting to see whether and
to what extent coe¢ cients of the other variables change with the inclusion of the belief
variables. Table 4 shows the most important results from the stockholding equation (11).
Table D2 in the Appendix D contains all estimates.
Expected stock market returns (^ ￿i) are strongly predictive of the probability of stock-
holding and the share of stocks in household portfolios. Individuals who believe that stock
23market returns are higher by one percentage point live in households that are 0.7 percentage
points more likely to own stocks, and if they own stocks, the share of stocks among their
￿nancial assets is 0.3 percentage points higher. The estimated correlation of perceived risk,
^ ￿; is not signi￿cant in the equations.
Other right hand-side variables have strong associations with the probability of stock-
holding, and most are of the expected sign. They are, however, at most weakly predictive
of the share of stocks in household portfolios, which makes the strong predictive power of
expected returns even more remarkable.
Inclusion of the stock market beliefs decreases the association of stockholding and the
other right hand-side variables. The association with education and cognitive capacity are
cut by a third. Single men and women are signi￿cantly less likely to hold stocks than
couples in the reduced form but not if we condition on their stock market beliefs. Females
in couples are of course just as likely to hold stocks as the reference group of coupled men
because stockholding is de￿ned at the household level. Their beliefs are, however, a lot less
optimistic, and that￿ s why, conditional on their beliefs, they should be more likely to hold
stocks according to the second model. African Americans are 23 percentage points less likely
to hold stocks in the ￿rst model (conditional on all the other right hand-side variables), and
the di⁄erence drops to 18 percentage points if beliefs are also controlled. The di⁄erence
between Hispanics and non-Hispanics are 23 percentage points (again conditional on the
other right hand-side variables), and is una⁄ected by the inclusion of beliefs.10
Overall, our ￿ndings suggest that those people who should learn about returns in the
stock market do learn and, given their beliefs, those people who should invest do invest.
It is important to emphasize that the estimated coe¢ cients in Table 4 do not capture the
causal e⁄ect of beliefs about stock returns on stock holding. Rather, as our theoretical model
emphasizes, beliefs are the product of a process of learning (or failure to learn) that takes
place over the life cycle with many feedback loops between observations of market returns,
evolution of earnings and wealth and investments in learning.
10For robustness checks, we re-estimated all models with the ￿nancial respondents only, as well as with
alternative speci￿cations for the heterogeneity in ~ ￿i: The results, shown in the appendix tables D3 through
D10 in the Appendix D, are very similar to those presented above.
24Table 4. Subjective stock market beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin.
Pr(si > 0), partial e⁄ects E (sijsi > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
^ ￿i 0:734 0:302
(0.088)￿￿ (0.110)￿￿
^ ￿i ￿0:050 0:144
(0.108) (0.131)
Log lifetime earnings 0:041 0:034 0:000 ￿0:003
(0.010)￿￿ (0.010)￿￿ (0.012) (0.012)
Education 0:033 0:023 0:011 0:008
(0.004)￿￿ (0.004)￿￿ (0.05)￿￿ (0.005)
Cognitive capacity 0:069 0:044 0:002 ￿0:009
(0.012)￿￿ (0.012)￿￿ (0.015) (0.015)
Log risk tolerance 0:023 ￿0:039 0:048 0:030
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028)￿ (0.029)
Single female ￿0:110 0:021 ￿0:023 0:009
(0.023)￿￿ (0.032) (0.029) (0.037)
Single male ￿0:094 ￿0:031 ￿0:022 ￿0:005
(0.029)￿￿ (0.031) (0.037) (0.038)
Female in couple ￿0:003 0:087 0:010 0:029
(0.016) (0.024)￿￿ (0.017) (0.025)
African American ￿0:233 ￿0:181 0:034 0:057
(0.030)￿￿ (0.030)￿￿ (0.046) (0.053)
Hispanic ￿0:229 ￿0:225 ￿0:008 ￿0:004
(0.044)￿￿ (0.043)￿￿ (0.066) (0.064)
Other variables YES YES YES YES
Probit models (1) and (2); truncated regression models (3) and (4).
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped for models (2).and (4)
￿￿ signi￿cant at 1%; ￿ signi￿cant at 5%
Sample: HRS 2002, 55 to 64 years old ￿nancial respondents (partner is also 55 to 64)
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Using survey data on subjective probabilities and a rich set of personal characteristics, this
paper estimates heterogeneity in stock market beliefs and proposes an explanation for the
source of that heterogeneity. We show descriptive evidence and develop a structural measure-
ment model to capture the theoretically important belief parameters and separate survey
noise from relevant heterogeneity. We provide detailed evidence on survey noise and the
measurement model accommodates all the noise features we document. The results are con-
sistent with our proposed explanation for heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. They also
reinforce previous results about the predictive power of beliefs on stockholding.
Our results establish the importance of belief heterogeneity in household ￿nances. They
show that survey answers to probability questions can be helpful in characterizing individual
beliefs, but their analysis should recognize the importance of survey noise. Our econometric
model is a simple but sensible attempt to deal with measurement error that may be a useful
reference for further research in this direction.
Our structural estimation results on the subjective mean of stock returns are relatively
strong, while our results on the subjective standard deviation are weaker. We explored
di⁄erent models with di⁄erent assumptions about the form of heterogeneity in the subjective
standard deviation, and the results were always qualitatively similar. It is possible that
answers to more probability questions or probability questions that are de￿ned for more
distant horizons would result in stronger identi￿cation in the presence of substantial survey
noise.
So, what can we learn from these results? First, the HRS survey data is consistent with
a model in which beliefs about the stock market depend on ￿nancial knowledge and the
acquisition of ￿nancial knowledge is costly. Although our results emphasize the importance
of beliefs, on a cautionary note, they also suggest that the strong correlation between beliefs
and stock market participation in the HRS and other surveys cannot be interpreted as
a causal relationship. Second, our results in some ways support the recent emphasis on
￿nding ways to improve ￿nancial literacy as potentially useful policy to help people prepare
for retirement. It would be useful to know more than we do about the mechanisms by
which people acquire ￿nancial knowledge. Our model suggests that feedback e⁄ects through
learning by doing may have large cumulative e⁄ects in the long run. Thus, policies that
26encourage participation in stockholding at a small scale early in the life cycle may motivate
people both to improve their knowledge of risks and returns and to increase their level of
saving.
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29Appendices
A Details of the theoretical model
In this Appendix we present and solve a simple three-period life-cycle model of consumption
and saving with risky assets, heterogeneous beliefs about the parameters of the distribution
of returns, and potential learning about those parameters. The model is built on the "small
scale" model of Haliassos and Michaels (2002), and we add to it elements that are connected
to ideas in the human capital literature (e.g., Becker, 1964), its application to the acqui-
sition of ￿nancial knowledge (Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis, 2008), and the theory of
information choice (Veldkamp, 2011).
Consider individual i who lives for three periods. Period 1 contains her young active years
(e.g., age 20 through 40), period 2 her active years in mature age (e.g., age 40 through 60),
and in period 3 she is retired. In periods t = 1;2 she receives labor income Yit. In period 3 she
receives pension bene￿ts that are a function of her previous earnings Yi3 = ￿ (Yi1;Yi2). We
abstract away from taxes and non-labor income other than pensions. Importantly, pensions
are from a de￿ned-bene￿ts-type system such as Social Security, and pension bene￿ts are a
concave function of lifetime earnings.11 As a result, people who earn above certain threshold
have an incentive to save for retirement, and the saving rate may depend on lifetime earnings.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no uncertainty in earnings, the retirement age, pension
bene￿ts or the length of life.
In each period, individual i can save. Savings can be invested in bank accounts (Bit)
that yield a ￿xed gross interest Rf or in equity (Sit) that yield stochastic potential return
Rt ￿ iidlogN (￿;￿). The individual cannot borrow or short the risky asset so Bit ￿ 0 and
Sit ￿ 0: Risky returns Rt are de￿ned as potential returns in the sense that the actual returns
individual i can earn come at a discount of ￿ so that e⁄ective returns are Re
t = Rte￿￿ ￿
logN (￿ ￿ ￿;￿). The idea here is that Rt denotes the yearly gain on an ideal portfolio of risky
assets. In this paper we assume that the ideal portfolio is the stock market index fund, and
therefore realizations of Rt are the realized returns on the stock market index. We assume
11The Social Security bene￿t formula is very concave indeed. It starts with de￿ning average monthly
earnings from the lifetime earnings history, in which months without earnings count as zero. Bene￿ts are 90
per cent of that average up to a relatively low level of earnnings; earnings in the middle range are transformed
into bene￿ts by a 32 per cent factor; and a factor of 15 per cent is used for high levels of earnings.
30that individuals earn less than the return on such an ideal portfolio because of proportional
transaction costs (therefore the notation ￿) and sub-optimal choice of underlying assets.
Importantly, we assume that the survey questions in HRS (p0 and p10) ask about potential
returns Rt, but individual investment decisions are based on e⁄ective returns Re
t. Rt is a
random variable but the factor ￿ is not. Realizations of potential returns Rt are common
across all individuals. However, individuals may di⁄er in their beliefs about the parameters
of the distribution of Rt (but they all think it is i.i.d. lognormal). Individual beliefs about
the parameters are denoted by tilde over the greek letters denoting true parameters, e.g., ~ ￿.
In the beginning of period 1, individual i is endowed with a set of beliefs about the para-
meters of the distribution of potential returns Rt. Beliefs about parameter ￿2 are assumed to
be the same for everybody (this setup is the same as the one used by Brennan, 1998). At the
same time, there is uncertainty about ￿ with heterogeneous beliefs. Individuals have some
belief ~ ￿ but they know that they don￿ t know the true ￿. We refer to incomplete knowledge
about ￿ as uncertainty and model it by a prior distribution of ￿, which is normal, centered
around ~ ￿i1, and its variance ~ ￿2
￿i1 is potentially heterogenous, too.
In this setup, the distribution of log gross potential returns is perceived as normal with
mean ~ ￿i1 = ~ Eit [￿] (the individual-speci￿c mean of the random variable ￿) and variance
~ ￿2
i1 = ~ ￿2
￿i1 + ￿2 (the reduced-form variance is the sum of variance due to individual-speci￿c
parameter uncertainty and ￿xed variance due to risk). When individual i makes the portfolio
choice decision in period 1, she thinks that risky returns follow a lognormal distribution with
parameters
￿
~ ￿i1; ~ ￿2
i1
￿
. Heterogeneity in period 1 beliefs is predetermined by di⁄erences in
what people may learn at home or in school, or di⁄erences in personality (degree of general
optimism and general uncertainty). If they do not learn more about the returns, individuals
enter period 2 with the same beliefs: ~ ￿i2 = ~ ￿i1 and ~ ￿2
i2 = ~ ￿2
i1. However, their beliefs can
change as results of two kinds of learning.
The ￿rst kind is mechanical learning, or passive learning following the terminology of
Veldkamp (2011). If an individual invests in Si1, the realized returns will make her change
her beliefs by Bayesian updating. Since the length of period 1 is unity, and the realized
31returns are R1 for everyone, the results of passive learning are the Bayesian posteriors
~ ￿i2 =
￿2~ ￿1i + ~ ￿2
￿i1R1


























As a result of passive learning, individuals update their ~ ￿ in the direction of the realized
stock market returns in period 1, and their uncertainty decreases.
The second kind of learning is active learning (again, following the terminology of Veld-
kamp, 2011). Individuals can invest in learning even if they do not invest in period 1. Also,
those who are investors in period 1 may learn more than simply observing the returns they
realize. Active learning is an investment in one￿ s ￿nancial knowledge, which is a form of
human capital. Many insights of the large literature on investment into human capital may
apply to active learning (see, e.g., Becker, 1964).
Active learning a⁄ects attainable returns in two ways. The ￿rst is Bayesian updating of
one￿ s beliefs about ￿ and ￿. The investor can update her beliefs by observing a history of
past returns, where the length of the history is hi. While hi should be a decision variable in
general, we abstract away from that in this simple model and ￿x it to h. We set h > 1 in
order to re￿ ect a longer horizon than available in mechanical learning. With history length
h and observed average stock market returns ￿ Rh the result of active learning is the Bayesian
posterior distribution
~ ￿i2 =
￿2~ ￿1i + h~ ￿2
￿i1 ￿ Rh


























Similarly to passive learning, individuals update their ~ ￿ in the direction of the realized
returns in the observed time horizon, and their uncertainty decreases. Those are ex post
results of learning. Active learning is a choice based on results that are expected ex ante.
Ex ante, individuals do not know in which direction their ~ ￿ will be updated. In particular,
they do not expect their mean to change after learning. But they know that learning will
32decrease their uncertainty.12
The second aspect of learning a⁄ects individual transaction costs ￿ that discount potential
returns. Recall that although potential returns are Rt, individuals can attain returns of Rte￿￿
on their investment Sit. By active learning, we assume that individuals can decrease their
transaction cost ￿. For simplicity, we assume that active learning leads to ￿ = 0 so that
active learners can expect to realize (and do realize) Rt on their investment Sit.
Active learning is an investment. We assume that its two aspects are bundled so that
those who choose to learn will see their beliefs updated as in (16) through (18) and their
transaction costs ￿ reduced (to zero in this simple setup). Active learning entails individual-
speci￿c costs of Di that are to be paid in period 1. Note a key aspect of this investment
setup: while the bene￿ts to active learning are related to the amount to invest into the risky
assets, the costs are not. This aspect will drive many of our most important implications.
Combining all the ingredients outlined above, the decision problem of the individual can












Xit ￿ Cit + Bit + Sit + fit + Dit (21)
fit = f ￿ 1(Sit > 0) (22)
Di1 = D if active learning in period 1 (23)










Rf + Yit (25)
Bit ￿ 0; Sit ￿ 0 (26)
The utility function in (19) is standard expected utility, Cit is consumption, ￿ is the
discount factor. The instantaneous utility function is CRRA, and ￿ is the parameter for
risk aversion and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution at the same time.
The budget line in (21) states that the sum of investments Bit and Sit (bonds and stocks,
12In this setup, the decrease in uncertainty is a deterministic function of h because of the simplistic
assumption of known ￿2. But uncertainty decreases in h in richer setups as well as long as the observed
returns are from a stationary distribution.
33respectively), the ￿xed costs of investment (fit), and the cost of active learning (Dit) cannot
exceed cash on hand (Xit). Fixed costs need to be paid if one invests in the risky assets, and
their role is to prevent very small investments. D needs to be paid if one invests in active
learning. In our setup the only time people may invest into active learning is period 1 (no
one wants to save in period 3, and thus it is never optimal to learn later than period 1).
Equation (25) describes the equation of motion for cash on hand. In the beginning of every
period t earnings (Yit) are received, and the returns on previous period (t ￿ 1) investments
are collected. In case of stocks, these are net returns that include proportional transaction
costs ￿. Equation (26) states the nonnegativity constraints that make borrowing and short
selling impossible.
This model is relatively simple, but it does not yield to analytical solutions. In order to
get the implications for our empirical investigation, we simulated out the policy function.
The model can be solved with backward induction. In the third period the optimal behavior
is trivial. There is only one state variable, Xi3 (cash-on-hand in period 3) and one control
variable Ci3 (consumption). The optimal policy is to consume everything, Ci3 = Xi3. The
second period is more complex. There are four state variables: Xi2, Di1 (whether the
individual had active learning in period 1) and the belief parameters ~ ￿i2 and ~ ￿2
i2. The two
control variables are Bi2 and Si2 which then imply Ci2. The optimal second period policy
function and the implied value function can be computed by simulation. We computed the
optimal decision for a large number of grid points on the state variables and then we used
cubic splines to approximate the functions for their entire domains. In the ￿rst period there
is no state variable, but there are three control variables: Bi1, Si2 and Di1.
We solved the model for a large number of di⁄erent parameter values. Some parameters







The second set of variables are the wage variables. The heterogeneity of lifetime income
and its link to learning and investment is our primary focus so we computed the optimal
34policy function for a large set of wage values. We generated a distribution of earnings that
resembles the observed distribution. As a benchmark, we set the ratio of Yi2 to Yi1 to 2 (so
that Yi2 = 2Yi1). The distribution of earnings is set to lognormal in both the ￿rst and the
second period (or generation). We have set the 5th percentile of the Yi1 to be 0:4 and the
95th percentile of the Yi1 to be 2:2. This way the population average of Yi1 is normalized to
roughly 1.
For the third period income we used a simpli￿ed social security formula. First we com-
puted the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) as the average of the prior wages,
PIAi = 0:5(Yi2 + Yi1). Then we have chosen two bendpoints, Q1 and Q2. The third period





0:9PIAi if PIAi ￿ Q1
0:9Q1 + 0:32(PIAi ￿ Q1) if Q1 < PIAi ￿ Q2
0:9Q1 + 0:32(Q2 ￿ Q1) + 0:15(PIAi ￿ Q3) if Q2 < PIAi
The bendpoints were chosen to be Q1 = 1:25 (approximately the 40th percentile) and Q2 =
2:65 (approximately the 90th percentile).
The rest of the parameters, due to lack of consensus about their values, had to be cal-
ibrated di⁄erently. We have chosen basic values that made the results interesting, and we
have run sensitivity analyses to see how the results change as we move away from these








Perhaps the most important but also a rather straightforward result of the model is that
an increase in lifetime earnings leads to an increased propensity to learn and to invest. In the
setup here, the only source of heterogeneity is in earnings. Figure A1 illustrates the results
using our default parameter values. There is a ￿rst threshold value of second period earnings
(￿ 1:75) below which nobody learns and nobody participates on the stock market. Between
this and a second threshold value (￿ 2:13) people participate on the stock market but they do
35not acquire ￿nancial knowledge. People whose second period earnings are above the second
threshold, and consequently who had the most incentive to save, both learn actively and
participate on the stock market. The pattern that, other things equal, the lowest earners do
not learn and do not invest, the middle income people do not learn but invest and the rich
both invest and learn is universal in this model, but the two threshold values can coincide
in which case all investors are knowledgeable.
This relationship between lifetime earnings and learning is due to saving motives in this
model. Expected bene￿ts of learning are increasing in the level of period-2 savings. Ceteris
paribus, those who intend to save less will see lower bene￿ts to learning than those who
intend to save more. Since intended period-2 savings are increasing in lifetime earnings,
expected bene￿ts to learning are increasing in lifetime earnings as well. At the same time,
the costs of investment, D; aren￿ t directly related to the amount to invest. As a result, the
likelihood of learning and investing is increasing in lifetime earnings.
In a richer and more realistic setting learning costs would also be heterogeneous. In
reality, learning costs are likely to be negatively correlated with earnings. Heterogeneity
in lifetime earnings re￿ ects heterogeneity in general human capital (Becker, 1964). Hetero-
geneity in human capital is the result of di⁄erences in the costs as well as the bene￿ts to
investment into human capital (Willis, 1986, and Card, 1998). Those costs include general
skills and family background, which likely play important roles in determining costs of learn-
ing about stock returns, too. Therefore, those who have higher lifetime earnings because of
higher levels of human capital are also likely to face lower learning costs of stock returns.
36This ampli￿es the positive relationship between learning and earnings.
The 8 panels in Figures A2 show additional comparative static results. Each ￿gure shows
the fraction of individuals who choose to learn in period 1 and the fraction of individuals
holding stocks in period 2. These fractions are calculated using the simulated distribution
of earnings as described above.
The results are very intuitive. Panel a) of Figure A2 shows that as the cost of learning
increases, the fraction of people who choose to learn decreases. The increasing learnings costs
make active learning less bene￿cial but that does not necessarily discourage stock market
participation. As long as learning costs are su¢ ciently high to begin with, a further increase
in it would only make people participate on the stock market without learning. This is
the case on Figure A1, where an increase in learning cost leads to a monotonic decrease in
active learning, but that does not fully translate into lower stockholding above some level of
learning costs.
Panel b) shows a reverse picture. As the period-1 expectation of the mean of log potential
returns increases, stockholding in period 2 increases dramatically, and the probability of
learning increases as well up to a point. Above some expected potential returns, some people
can acquire su¢ ciently high e⁄ective returns in the second period even without ￿nancial
knowledge, but they choose not to invest in knowledge in the ￿rst period when they are
relatively poor.
Panel c) shows that parameter uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about ￿) is negatively related
to stock market participation and weakly negatively related to learning. The expected value
of a lognormally distributed variable positively depends on the variance of its logarithm13.
This panel nets out this e⁄ect. In order to show the pure e⁄ect of increasing uncertainty, we
have imposed a mean-preserving spread such that expected returns are the same in all ￿ve
cases. This result shows that, in this setup, the prospect of decreased uncertainty is not an
important motive for learning. The expectation of gains is the important motive.14 Panel d)
shows that increasing the ￿xed costs of participation leads to decreasing stockholding, and
albeit in a much less pronounced way, it also leads to less learning.
Panel e) shows the e⁄ect of increasing transaction costs ￿, the discount from potential
13E (Rit) = exp
￿




14In case we do not make the adjustment of the mean log return the dependence between uncertainty
and learning vanishes completely, and the dependence between uncertainty and participation becomes very
weakly positive.
3738returns. Increasing this discount decreases e⁄ective attainable returns conditional on Rt,
but it increases the expected gains from active learning. The results imply that the e⁄ects
on both learning and on stockholding in period 2 are substantial, but the two e⁄ects go in
the opposite direction. Higher discount makes participation without ￿nancial knowledge less
bene￿cial. Some of these people would leave the market, but some would decide to learn
and stay on the market.
Panel f) shows a strong and monotonic negative relationship between risk aversion on the
one hand, and learning and subsequent stockholding on the other hand. Higher risk aversion
leads to a smaller fraction of savings put into stocks, ceteris paribus, which decreases the
value of learning about stock returns (especially since the primary e⁄ect of such learning is
increased expected returns and not decreased risk). Panel g) shows that increased patience
increases stockholding and learning as well. It is partly because more patient individuals
plan to save more, and partly because they are more willing to pay the costs of learning in
period 1 for its expected bene￿ts in period 2.
Finally, panel h) shows that as the age-earnings pro￿le gets ￿ atter (period 1 earnings
increase at the cost of period 2 earnings), the probability of learning increases and the e⁄ect
on stock market participation is rather ambiguous. In order to net out wealth e⁄ects lifetime
earnings are kept constant in all ￿ve speci￿cations and only the ratio of ￿rst and second
period wage is changing. A ￿ atter wage pro￿le makes any investment in the ￿rst period
more likely as the marginal value of consumption loss in period 1 decreases. There are two
opposing e⁄ects on stock market participation. First, a ￿ atter wage pro￿le decreases second
period earnings, which makes people less likely to participate on the stock market. Second,
if the earnings pro￿le is su¢ ciently ￿ at, the increasing number of ￿nancially knowledgeable
people would push stock market participation up. In this particular setup, the ￿rst e⁄ect
dominates at very steep pro￿les, and the second e⁄ect dominates at very ￿ at pro￿les. In
general, it is not evident which of the two e⁄ects is stronger.
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40B Data, descriptive statistics and detailed evidence on
noise and information in the probability answers
B.1 Sample and stockholding
Table B1. Sample size
Age 55-64a Other respondentsb
HRS 2002 4;056 12;074
HRS 2004 3;676 14;651
HRS 2006 3;182 14;027
HRS 2008 (before Sep) 2;512 11;161
aIndividuals of age 55 to 64 and whose spouse is of age 55 to 64 as well (or have no spouse)
Table B2. Fraction of stockholders in the sample
Stockholders
outside retirement acc.a in retirement acc.b All
HRS 2002 0:37 0:33 0:51
HRS 2004 0:34 0:32 0:49
HRS 2006 0:29 0:29 0:45
HRS 2008 (before Sep) 0:26 0:29 0:42
a Have investments in stocks or mutual funds outside retirement accounts
b Have stocks or mutual funds within retirement accounts
Table B3. Share of stocks in the portfolio among stockholders in the sample
Stockholders
outside retirement acc.a in retirement acc.b All
HRS 2002 0:59 0:79 0:56
HRS 2004 0:58 0:75 0:56
HRS 2006 0:53 0:81 0:56
HRS 2008 (before Sep) 0:51 0:78 0:53
a Have investments in stocks or mutual funds outside retirement accounts
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Figure B4. Share of stocks in the portfolio of stockholders, and ￿nancial wealth. HRS 2002.
43B.2 The proxy variable for lifetime earnings
The source of the lifetime earnings data is the Detailed and the Summary Earnings Records
(DER and SER) derived from the Master Earnings File (MEF) of the Social Security Ad-
ministration that is linked to HRS. For details about the MEF and the linking procedure
see Olsen and Hudson (2009) and the documents on the HRS website.15
The DER data is derived from the W-2 forms ￿led by employers to the Internal Revenue
Service each year, and it is available from 1978 onward. The SER data is available since
1951, but it contains information only on jobs covered by social security and income up to
the taxable maximum. In principle the DER data is superior to the SER as it covers more
jobs and it provides more precise information on high income people whose earnings records
are capped in SER but uncapped in DER. Therefore we gave priority to the DER data and
we only used the SER in exceptional cases described below.
The main issue of the linking procedure is that HRS needed to acquire written consent
from sample members in order to get the administrative information on them. HRS made a
lot of e⁄ort to increase the participation rate, but it remained below 100 percent. Generally
HRS has a relatively good coverage rate for earnings before 1992 (slightly above 80 percent)
and moderately good coverage rate for earnings afterwards (around 60 percent). Below we
provide precise numbers about the attrition rate for our target sample, which will be higher
than these numbers. HRS asked for consent in each wave, but in some waves only people
with prior consent were asked. Before 2006 the consent covered years up to the interview
year, but since 2006 the consent covers future years as well. The consequence is that, as of
now, the coverage rates are typically higher for earlier waves (people had more chance to
provide consent), but in the future this di⁄erence will diminish. Another problem beyond
coverage rate is selection. There is evidence that giving consent is not random. Men, the
educated, the rich and minorities are underrepresented in the merged sample. See the text
for details about how we handle this problem.
Our primary sample is a ten year cohort, people 55-64 years old in 2002 and whose spouse
15There are two relatively detailed documents under the data section at hrsonline.isr.umich.edu that can
be accessed after free registration. Note that the social security data is not public, and thus only these
documents are available but not the data. The website also provides detailed information about how to get
permission to use the restricted data.
44is in the same age range, too.16 In some speci￿cations we look at people in the same age
range in 2004, 2006 and 2008 as well. As Table B4 shows our target sample size is 4056 in
2002, 3672 in 2004, 3174 in 2006 and 2506 in 2008. Hudomiet, KØzdi and Willis (2011) show
that shortly after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 stock market beliefs of
households changed substantially and in an unusual way. For this reason we decided to drop
interviews that were made after September 2008 in this paper.
The earnings data we created is the average CPI-adjusted earnings in a 15 year period,
between age 40 and 55.17 The earliest year we used is 1978, which is for earnings at age
40 for people who were 64 in 2002 (2002 ￿ 64 + 40 = 1978). The DER data in principle
is available from 1978, but the version of the data stored at HRS only covers years 1980
onward. The HRS sta⁄ claims that there were some technical problems with the 1978 and
the 1979 DER data, and therefore they decided against merging it to HRS. Therefore all
the 1978 and 1979 earnings information is coming from the SER. Another issue happened in
1998-2000. HRS ￿rst acquired only the DER data until 1997, and then it acquired the SER
data until 1999. Therefore for people who stopped giving consent after 2000, we only have
SER information for their earnings from 1998 and 1999.
Table B4 shows the quality of the social security earnings information in HRS. As we
can see we had no information about the earnings of 612 people in 2002 (15 percent). This
number is similar in later waves as well, but due to the falling sample size the ratio of missing
values is increasing. Among those who provided some information the majority did so for
all the 15 years we needed for our lifetime earnings proxy. The nature of the data is such
that missing years can only happen at the end of the period and only for those who stopped
giving consent to HRS to collect the earnings data on them. In 2002 we have all the necessary
years for 2733 people, we have 10-14 years of information for 590 people and less than 10
years for 121 people. The corresponding numbers for later waves are smaller in level but
very similar as a percentage. Here the decision we made was to disregard the earnings data
for everyone for whom we have less than 10 years of information, and use the available years
for imputation for those who only have 5 or less missing years.
16People who are at least 55 years old, but they haven￿ t turned 65 yet.
17People who are at least 40 years old but haven￿ t turned 55 yet.
45Table B4. Social Security earnings availablility in our target samples
2002 2004 2006 2008￿
Target sample size 4056 3672 3174 2506
All 15 years available 2733 2521 1974 1337
10-14 years available 590 376 405 469
1-9 years available 121 91 64 44
no SSA information 612 684 731 656
￿ Interviews made prior to October 2008
For con￿dentiality reasons HRS top-coded all the earnings variables. For people whose
earnings were above $250,000 in a given year, we only have interval information, where
the intervals are $250,000-$299,999; $300,000-$499,999 and $500,000 and above. Topcoded
responses were imputed with a procedure described below. HRS also rounded earnings
below $250,000 to the closest multiple of $100, with the exception of $0-$49, where we can
di⁄erentiate between a true $0 and a $1-$49 value.
The DER data contains ￿ve earnings variables:
1. Total compensation: This variable amounts to the sum of the Box 1 values on each
W-2 forms submitted on behalf of a person by all his employers. Total compensation
includes wages, bonuses, non-cash payments and tips18. Total compensation typically
does not include deferred payments such as contributions to a 401k plans, but certain
plans are included. This variables is uncapped, meaning that high income vales are
not censored, only topcoded.
2. Social security earnings: This variables is derived from the Box 3 values of the corre-
sponding W-2 forms. There are two major di⁄erences between this variable and total
compensation. The ￿rst di⁄erence is that social security earnings contain information
on deferred compensation as well. The second di⁄erence is that this variable is capped
at the taxable maximum. The taxable maximum was changing year by year. In 2002 it
was $80,400, for example, meaning that any earnings beyond this amount are missing.
3. Medicare earnings: This variable is based on the Box 5 values of the W-2 forms.
Medicare earnings are almost identical to social security earnings. The main di⁄er-
ence is between the taxable maximums used for the two measures. Before 1991 the
18Only tips that the employee reported to the employer. Allocated tips are not part of Box 1.
46medicare and the social security caps were identical. Since 1994 there is no limit on
the taxable earnings for medicare, and between 1991 and 1993 the di⁄erence between
the medicare and the social security taxable maximums were diverging.
4. FICA taxable self employment earnings: This variable is based on Form 1040 Schedule
SE reported by the self employed to IRS. The variable is capped at the same amounts
as the social security earnings.
5. Medicare taxable self employment earnings: This variable is almost identical to the
previous, but here the less restrictive medicare caps are used.
The SER data contains only one variable which is the sum of all his wage, salary and self
employment income. Similarly to social security DER earnings the variable has information
only on jobs covered by social security and contains capped values at the social security
taxable maximum.
The correlation between these variables are generally very high, but they are not identical.
In principle the best quality data is the post 1994 values of the medicare earnings which is
uncapped and it also contains information on deferred compensation. The decision we made
was the following. First we took the maximum of the total compensation, the social security,
and the medicare earnings. In case the maximum was capped or topcoded, we imputed a
value with a procedure described below. Second, we took the maximum of the FICA and
the medicare taxable self employment earnings. Again, if the maximum was capped or
topcoded, we used imputation. Third, we added the employment and the self-employment
values. Fourth, we compared this sum to the SER data and took the maximum. After this
procedure we had an almost complete person-year-earnings dataset.19 The ￿nal step was the
imputation of the remaining missing values.
We needed to impute earnings in three cases. The ￿rst is topcoded and rounded responses;
the second is for people who stopped giving consent to HRS and therefore their earnings are
missing for their last years; and the third is for capped earnings values. Out of these three
only the second one a⁄ected many respondents (590 in 2002), topcoding and capping were
less severe issues.
19One technical issue was that missing values and zero earnings were hard to distinguish in the DER data,
but it was precisely stored in the version of the SER data HRS provided.
47Topcoded and rounded responses were imputed in a very simple way. For the $250,000-
$299,999 interval we imputed $270,000; for the $300,000-$499,999 interval we imputed $370,000;
for the $500,000 and above interval we imputed $710,000, and for the $1-$49 interval we im-
puted $40. Other rounded responses were not imputed, we used the rounded values. The
values we used were motivated by interval regressions for the logarithm of earnings. If one
assumes log-normally distributed earnings, estimates an interval regression, and computes
the conditional expected value of a given interval, then he gets numbers that are very close to
the values we used. We estimated models with and without ￿ exible time trends in earnings
and with and without basic demographic variables such as gender, age and education, and
the resulting conditional expectations were always very close to these numbers.
For people whose last earnings values were missing we used their earlier earnings for
imputation. As described above, we only have people in our sample with at least ten years
of information and thus maximum 5 years of missing earnings. We saw two possibilities for
imputation. We could either impute the mean of earlier wages, or we could put more weight
on recent years. We have found that many people in our sample had notable ￿ uctuations in
their earnings so we decided to use the second approach. First we identi￿ed the last four valid
earning values for each missing value. Second, we adjusted all the four values with the cpi
to get an initial guess for the missing earnings. Then we averaged these values with relative
weights 1=t if the initial guess was based on earnings t years before the missing response. For
example let us say that for a given person we only had earnings up to 1991, and we wanted
to impute values for 1992-1994. Let us take the 1994 value. We took the person￿ s earnings
from 1988,1989,1990 and 1991, adjusted these values with the cpi, and averaged them with
relative weights 1=6;1=5;1=4 and 1=3.
Capped earning values were imputed in a very similar fashion to the previous. Recall
that capping applied to people whose earnings were higher than the taxable maximum. As
the taxable maximum increased over time we decided to use the next four earnings values
instead of the last four. Moreover, when an initial guess turned out to be lower than the
taxable maximum, we replaced the guess with the taxable maximum. When the ￿nal guess
was equal to the taxable maximum (when all the four initial guesses were lower than that)
we imputed 110 percent of the taxable maximum. Another problem was that sometime we
had less than four initial guesses, in which case we used as many as we had. When there
was no initial guess at all, we again imputed 110 percent of the taxable maximum.
48Finally, we simply imputed the sample mean for all the missing observations. The last
two rows of Table B4 shows that the number of imputed observations were 733 in 2002 and
similar in magnitude in the later waves as well. In the regression analyses, we entered a
dummy variable for missing (and therefore imputed) earnings data.


















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent


















0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent
Empirical distribution of p10 answers
Figure B5. The distribution of reported subjective probabilities of a gain of the stock
market (p0) and the 10 per cent or larger gain (p10). HRS 2002, estimation sample
(n = 2969)
Table B4. Patterns of survey noise in the core questionnaire
Fraction of responses where HRS 2002 HRS 2004 HRS 2006 HRS 2008
p0 = 0:5 0:238 0:262 0:239 0:254
p0 = 0:0 or p0 = 1:0 0:119 0:077 0:073 0:062
p0 rounded other ten per cent 0:509 0:512 0:559 0:539
p0 rounded 25% or 75% 0:088 0:096 0:082 0:096
p0 not round number 0:047 0:054 0:047 0:048
Total 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000
p0 > p10 0:425
p0 = p10 0:439
p0 < p10 0:136
Total 1:000
50Table B5. Direct evidence on survey noise: Test-retest comparisons
using core questionnaire and experimental module answers
to the same probability questions from HRS 2002
p0 p10
Mean answer in core questionnaire 0:486 0:396
Mean answer in module 0:479 0:334
Di⁄erence (core minus module) 0:007 0:063
Standard dev. in core 0:290 0:272
Standard dev. in module 0:272 0:303
Di⁄erence (core minus module) 0:018 ￿0:031
Fraction who gave the same answer in core and module 0:273 0:179
Absolute value of di⁄erence between core and module 0:231 0:240
Correlation core and module answers 0:467 0:356
51Table B6. The propensity to give round answer to the to p0 question
(multiple of 10% or 25% or 75%)
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002-2008
Stockholder dummy -0.004
[0.005]




























Fin. wealth zero 0.000
[0.010]
Fin. wealth in middle -0.004
[0.008]
Fin. wealth high -0.005
[0.009]
Dummies for p0 categories YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,112 11,113
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.06
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 1.27 1.01
p-value 0.257 0.418
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mean fill for missing cognition, father's occ, risk tolearnce variables; dummies for missing values included but not shown.
LHS variable:   p0 answer rounded (dummy).     HRS 2002-2008
52Table B7. The propensity to give the same answer to p0 and p10
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002
Stockholder dummy -0.016
[0.020]




























Fin. wealth zero -0.045
[0.037]
Fin. wealth in middle 0.021
[0.030]
Fin. wealth high -0.017
[0.035]
Dummies for p0 categories YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,519 3,520
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.00
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 2.31 0.73
p-value 0.019 0.623
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mean fill for missing cognition, father'socc, risk tolearnce variables; dummies for missing values included but not shown.
LHS variable:   p0=p10 (dummy).    HRS 2002
53Table B8. The propensity to give smaller answer to p0 than p10
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002
Stockholder dummy -0.005
[0.014]




























Fin. wealth zero -0.005
[0.028]
Fin. wealth in middle -0.018
[0.022]
Fin. wealth high -0.016
[0.024]
Dummies for p0 categories NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,519 3,520
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 1.56 0.62
p-value 0.141 0.713
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mean fill for missing cognition, father'socc, risk tolearnce variables; dummies for missing values included but not shown.
LHS variable:   p0<p10 (dummy).    HRS 2002
54Table B9. Absolute value of the di⁄erence between p0 in the core and p0 in the module
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002
Stockholder dummy 0.044
[0.037]




























Fin. wealth zero 0.027
[0.081]
Fin. wealth in middle 0.044
[0.057]
Fin. wealth high 0.024
[0.063]
Dummies for p0 categories NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 1.26 1.19
p-value 0.272 0.314
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mean fill for missing cognition, father'socc, risk tolearnce variables; dummies for missing values included but not shown.
LHS variable:   | p0 - p0_module |.    HRS 2002
55Table B10. Absolute value of the di⁄erence between p10 in the core and p10 in the module
OLS regression results for the noise patterns in HRS 2002
Stockholder dummy 0.025
[0.036]




























Fin. wealth zero 0.146
[0.094]
Fin. wealth in middle 0.031
[0.051]
Fin. wealth high 0.017
[0.059]
Dummies for p0 categories NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03
F-test statistic for shown coeffs 1.26 1.19
p-value 0.272 0.314
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mean fill for missing cognition, father'socc, risk tolearnce variables; dummies for missing values included but not shown.
LHS variable:   | p10 - p10_module |.    HRS 2002
56B.4 Relevant heterogeneity in the probability answers
Table B11. Descriptive statistics of the subjective probability answers to the
stock market returns questions by survey wave. HRS 2002 through 2008.
￿ p0 V (p0i) ￿ p0 ￿ ￿ p10 Fraction missing p0
All respondents
2002 0:48 0:081 0:088 0:18
2004 0:52 0:068 0:12
2006 0:51 0:068 0:19
2008 (before September) 0:50 0:067 0:104 0:15
Stockholders
2002 0:56 0:081 0:113 0:06
2004 0:58 0:056 0:03
2006 0:57 0:056 0:05
2008 (before September) 0:56 0:055 0:129 0:04
Not stockholders
2002 0:40 0:081 0:064 0:27
2004 0:46 0:072 0:20
2006 0:46 0:072 0:28
2008 (before September) 0:46 0:071 0:086 0:21
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, waves 2002, 4, 6 and 8 (￿ p0 ￿ ￿ p10 is from HRS 2002 only).
Respondents of age 55 through 64 with a spouse of the same age range (and singles)
p0 is the answer to the probability of positive returns on stock markets by following year
57Table B12. OLS regression results for the stock market probability answers.
Panel 1: Without wealth on the right-hand side
p0 resid square p0 - p10 missing p0
Log lifetime earnings 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.032
[0.004]* [0.001] [0.004] [0.003]**
DB pension -0.009 -0.002 0.009 -0.012
[0.008] [0.002] [0.011] [0.008]
DC pension 0.016 -0.004 0.010 -0.023
[0.007]* [0.002] [0.010] [0.008]**
Education 0.008 -0.001 0.005 -0.015
[0.002]** [0.000]** [0.002]* [0.002]**
Cognition 0.024 -0.007 0.007 -0.037
[0.004]** [0.001]** [0.006] [0.005]**
Financial respondent 0.029 0.006 0.000 0.164
[0.009]** [0.003]* 0.000 [0.011]**
Log risk tolerance 0.044 0.002 0.022 -0.033
[0.012]** [0.004] [0.014] [0.012]**
Single female -0.082 -0.004 -0.045 0.092
[0.009]** [0.003] [0.012]** [0.010]**
Single male -0.032 0.000 -0.018 0.038
[0.012]** [0.004] [0.015] [0.012]**
Female in couple -0.065 -0.007 -0.023 0.071
[0.008]** [0.002]** [0.011]* [0.009]**
Age -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.013
[0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]**
Black -0.048 0.006 -0.019 0.022
[0.009]** [0.003] [0.011] [0.011]*
Hispanic 0.001 0.005 -0.029 0.112
[0.013] [0.004] [0.017] [0.016]**
Father manager/professional 0.019 0.001 0.018 0.004
[0.009]* [0.003] [0.012] [0.009]
Sunny day optimism 0.016 0.000 -0.006 0.004
[0.007]* [0.002] [0.008] [0.007]
Economic pessimism -0.092 -0.002 0.000 -0.003
[0.014]** [0.004] [0.017] [0.014]
Depressive symptomes -0.010 0.003 0.004 0.014
[0.004]** [0.001]* [0.004] [0.004]**
Fraction fifty answers -0.041 -0.124 -0.193 -0.069
[0.036] [0.011]** [0.045]** [0.040]
Dummies for missing varaibles YES YES YES YES
Dummies for years YES YES YES YES
Observations 9131 9131 3323 10887
R-squared 0.1 0.05 0.03 0.23
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
58Table B12. OLS regression results for the stock market probability answers.
Panel 2: Wealth included on the right-hand side
p0 resid square p0 - p10 missing p0
Log lifetime earnings 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.035
[0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.003]**
DB pension -0.010 -0.001 0.010 -0.008
[0.008] [0.002] [0.011] [0.008]
DC pension 0.017 -0.003 0.011 -0.022
[0.007]* [0.002] [0.010] [0.008]**
Education 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.012
[0.002]** [0.000]* [0.002] [0.002]**
Cognition 0.019 -0.007 0.006 -0.031
[0.004]** [0.001]** [0.006] [0.005]**
Financial respondent 0.033 0.006 0.000 0.156
[0.009]** [0.003]* 0.000 [0.011]**
Log risk tolerance 0.042 0.002 0.021 -0.031
[0.012]** [0.004] [0.014] [0.012]*
Single female -0.068 -0.005 -0.038 0.078
[0.009]** [0.003] [0.012]** [0.010]**
Single male -0.019 -0.001 -0.011 0.024
[0.012] [0.004] [0.015] [0.012]*
Female in couple -0.068 -0.007 -0.026 0.074
[0.008]** [0.002]** [0.011]* [0.009]**
Age -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.014
[0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]**
Black -0.031 0.005 -0.010 0.001
[0.009]** [0.003] [0.011] [0.011]
Hispanic 0.013 0.005 -0.022 0.095
[0.013] [0.004] [0.018] [0.016]**
Father manager/professional 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.007
[0.009] [0.003] [0.013] [0.009]
Sunny day optimism 0.015 0.000 -0.006 0.004
[0.007]* [0.002] [0.008] [0.007]
Economic pessimism -0.081 -0.003 0.008 -0.011
[0.014]** [0.004] [0.017] [0.014]
Depressive symptomes -0.007 0.002 0.006 0.010
[0.004] [0.001]* [0.004] [0.004]*
Fraction fifty answers -0.045 -0.116 -0.191 -0.044
[0.036] [0.011]** [0.045]** [0.040]
Wealth non-positive 0.017 0.002 -0.010 -0.014
[0.015] [0.005] [0.016] [0.016]
Wealth in middle 0.026 -0.002 0.002 -0.029
[0.008]** [0.003] [0.011] [0.010]**
Wealth high 0.049 0.000 0.025 -0.038
[0.010]** [0.003] [0.014] [0.012]**
Fin. wealth zero -0.021 0.003 0.002 0.056
[0.012] [0.004] [0.014] [0.015]**
Fin. wealth in middle 0.025 -0.003 0.014 -0.041
[0.008]** [0.003] [0.012] [0.010]**
Fin. wealth high 0.046 -0.001 0.028 -0.043
[0.010]** [0.003] [0.014]* [0.011]**
Dummies for missing varaibles YES YES YES YES
Dummies for years YES YES YES YES
Observations 9131 9131 3323 10887
R-squared 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.24
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
59Table B13. OLS regression results for the stock market probability answers.
Panel 1: Without wealth or belief-speci￿c variables on the right-hand side
HRS 2002-8 HRS 2002 HRS 2002-8 HRS 2002
p0 0.222 0.077
[0.019]** [0.020]**
p0 missing -0.140 0.005
[0.012]** [0.021]
p0 - p10 0.094 0.000 0.043
[0.033]** 0.000 [0.030]
Log lifetime earnings 0.042 0.046 0.005 0.008
[0.007]** [0.008]** [0.008] [0.009]
DB pension 0.040 0.021 -0.023 -0.005
[0.014]** [0.021] [0.012] [0.018]
DC pension 0.019 0.040 0.000 0.003
[0.013] [0.020]* [0.011] [0.017]
Education 0.027 0.025 0.006 0.005
[0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]* [0.004]
Cognition 0.055 0.063 0.001 0.001
[0.006]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.011]
Financial respondent -0.078 -0.159 0.001 0.001
[0.010]** [0.019]** [0.011] [0.037]
Log risk tolerance 0.038 0.037 0.024 0.031
[0.021] [0.024] [0.021] [0.023]
Single female -0.096 -0.129 -0.001 -0.006
[0.014]** [0.019]** [0.015] [0.021]
Single male -0.115 -0.130 0.022 -0.016
[0.018]** [0.025]** [0.020] [0.027]
Female in couple 0.029 0.011 0.007 0.018
[0.008]** [0.012] [0.007] [0.011]
Age 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.009
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]**
Black -0.196 -0.209 0.005 0.022
[0.016]** [0.022]** [0.023] [0.035]
Hispanic -0.136 -0.172 0.012 0.018
[0.019]** [0.027]** [0.031] [0.047]
Father manager/professional 0.095 0.069 0.001 0.006
[0.017]** [0.022]** [0.014] [0.018]
Dummies for missing varaibles YES YES YES YES
Dummies for years YES YES YES YES
Observations 10901 4055 4850 1876
R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.01 0.01
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Stockholding Share of stocks if stockholder
60Table B13. OLS regression results for the stock market probability answers.
Panel 2: Wealth and belief-speci￿c variables are included on the right-hand side
HRS 2002-8 HRS 2002 HRS 2002-8 HRS 2002
p0 0.109 0.070
[0.017]** [0.020]**
p0 missing -0.079 0.005
[0.011]** [0.020]
p0 - p10 0.026 0.000 0.044
[0.030] 0.000 [0.030]
Log lifetime earnings 0.017 0.016 0.003 0.006
[0.005]** [0.006]* [0.008] [0.008]
DB pension 0.022 0.005 -0.019 -0.001
[0.012] [0.019] [0.012] [0.018]
DC pension 0.020 0.041 0.002 0.006
[0.011] [0.018]* [0.011] [0.017]
Education 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.004
[0.002]** [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Cognition 0.020 0.029 0.002 -0.001
[0.005]** [0.008]** [0.008] [0.011]
Financial respondent -0.039 -0.068 -0.001 0.001
[0.008]** [0.016]** [0.011] [0.037]
Log risk tolerance 0.031 0.030 0.021 0.027
[0.018] [0.022] [0.021] [0.023]
Single female 0.005 -0.025 0.003 0.001
[0.012] [0.018] [0.015] [0.022]
Single male -0.024 -0.035 0.027 -0.017
[0.016] [0.023] [0.020] [0.027]
Female in couple 0.009 -0.009 0.009 0.017
[0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.011]
Age -0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.008
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]*
Black -0.100 -0.095 0.005 0.010
[0.014]** [0.021]** [0.022] [0.036]
Hispanic -0.074 -0.092 -0.006 -0.007
[0.017]** [0.025]** [0.032] [0.047]
Father manager/professional 0.053 0.027 -0.006 -0.004
[0.015]** [0.019] [0.014] [0.018]
Sunny day optimism 0.005 0.029 0.008 -0.016
[0.010] [0.013]* [0.012] [0.015]
Economic pessimism -0.106 -0.082 -0.061 -0.089
[0.018]** [0.026]** [0.023]** [0.033]**
Depressive symptomes -0.008 -0.012 0.011 0.009
[0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010]
Fraction fifty answers -0.092 -0.076 -0.149 -0.072
[0.053] [0.073] [0.066]* [0.089]
Wealth non-positive -0.005 -0.011 0.083 0.180
[0.012] [0.020] [0.050] [0.077]*
Wealth in middle 0.138 0.134 0.023 0.011
[0.016]** [0.024]** [0.021] [0.031]
Wealth high 0.279 0.278 0.069 0.045
[0.020]** [0.031]** [0.023]** [0.035]
Fin. wealth zero -0.006 -0.016 0.134 0.168
[0.012] [0.020] [0.045]** [0.067]*
Fin. wealth in middle 0.203 0.232 -0.113 -0.073
[0.016]** [0.025]** [0.021]** [0.032]*
Fin. wealth high 0.352 0.379 -0.099 -0.043
[0.020]** [0.031]** [0.022]** [0.035]
Dummies for missing varaibles YES YES YES YES
Dummies for years YES YES YES YES
Observations 10887 4054 4848 1876
R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.04 0.04
Stockholding Share of stocks if stockholder
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62C Details of the structural econometric model
C.1 Deriving the likelihood function



































~ ￿i + v10i
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Expressing the event in scalar terms makes it clear how we can invert the standard normal
c.d.f. and get algebraic expressions in terms of the latent variables ~ ￿i, ~ ￿i and v0i and v10i.
































We need distributional assumptions on the random variables to close the econometric
model and make it suitable for Maximum Likelihood estimation. First of all, we assume
that conditional on observables the individual mean, ~ ￿i is distributed normally:





u￿i ￿ N (0;V (u￿))
Second, we assume that individual uncertainty, ~ ￿i can take two values ~ ￿i 2 f~ ￿low; ~ ￿highg
where ~ ￿low is the low value corresponding to certain people and ~ ￿high is the high value for
63uncertain ones. These two cut points can be estimated, but sometimes we set ~ ￿low = 0:15
which is the historical standard deviation of yearly log-returns. Whether someone has high





~ ￿low if ￿
0
￿x￿i + ￿0
￿z￿i + u￿i ￿ 0
~ ￿high if otherwise
u￿i ￿ N (0;1)

















Lastly, we assume that u￿i;u￿i and vi ￿ (v0i; v10i)
0 are mutually independent.
Let ~ ￿i denote the vector of beliefs, v the vector of noise terms, pi the vector of probability
answers and let the parameter vector ￿ denote all parameters of the conditional density and
Xi denote the vector of all right hand-side variables. The quadrant Qkl that contains the
observed probability answers is de￿ned above.
~ ￿i ￿ (~ ￿i; ~ ￿i)
0
vi ￿ (v0i; v10i)
0


























Then the event described by (31) and (32) can be summarized as
pi 2 Qklj~ ￿i;vi
The individual (conditional) likelihood is the probability of observing that event condi-
tional on observables.
‘i ￿ ‘(pijXi; ￿) = Pr(pi 2 Qkl j Xi; ￿)
64It is worth expanding the likelihood by conditioning on ~ ￿i
‘i = ‘(pijXi; ￿;~ ￿i = ~ ￿low)Pr(~ ￿i = ~ ￿lowjXi; ￿)
+‘(pijXi; ￿;~ ￿i = ~ ￿high)Pr(~ ￿i = ~ ￿highjXi; ￿)










Thus it is enough to ￿nd an expression for ‘(pijXi; ￿;~ ￿i). Let us denote w0i ￿
u￿i
~ ￿i +v0i and
w10i ￿
u￿i
~ ￿i + v10i. The conditional likelihood is















































with the notation w
k+1














~ ￿i and wl





wi ￿ (w0i; w10i)
0 has a centered bivariate normal distribution and thus the likelihood
can be expressed from the bivariate normal c.d.f.























































As the bivariate normal distribution is available in standard econometric packages such as
Stata 11 the likelihood can be evaluated using (35).
C.2 Expected ~ ￿ and ~ ￿ conditional on the probability answers
The goal is to get
^ ￿i = b E[~ ￿ijpi 2 Qkl]
65Start from the individual likelihood (31) and (32). These describe the probability of the
probability answers falling in a certain interval, conditional on ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i. In the parsimonious
notation, (31) and (32) describe the event pi 2 Qklj~ ￿i. Our question is the reverse: it is the
density (and then the expectation) of ~ ￿i and ~ ￿i conditional on the probability answer:
E[~ ￿ijpi 2 Qkl] =
Z
~ ￿i ￿ f (~ ￿ijpi 2 Qkl)d(~ ￿i)
By Bayes￿theorem,
f (~ ￿ijpi 2 Qkl) =
Pr(pi 2 Qklj~ ￿i) ￿ f (~ ￿i)
Pr(pi 2 Qkl)
=
Pr(pi 2 Qklj~ ￿i)
li
￿ f (~ ￿i)
so that
^ ￿i = E[~ ￿ijpi 2 Qkl] =
Z
~ ￿i ￿
Pr(pi 2 Qklj~ ￿i)
li
￿ f (~ ￿i)d(~ ￿i) (36)
The only unknown part is Pr(pi 2 Qklj~ ￿i). It can be computed similarly to the likelihood
function.
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0i ￿ ￿￿1 (qk+1) ￿
~ ￿i
~ ￿i, vk




10i ￿ ￿￿1 (ql+1) ￿
~ ￿i
~ ￿i + 0:1




~ ￿i + 0:1
~ ￿i . Note that this is di⁄erent from the analogous formula in the likelihood
function because, at this stage we "know" (~ ￿i; ~ ￿i). (In practice, we simulate it out using the
estimated parameters which completely specify its distribution.)
The probability in question is again the probability mass over a rectangle:








































66Having all elements in (36) the integration can be approximated by simulation. With





Pr(pi 2 Qklj~ ￿i)
li









pi 2 Qklj~ ￿i;s
￿
li






pi 2 Qij~ ￿i;s
￿
li
C.3 Estimating the variance and correlation of survey noise
The goal of this exercise is to estimate moments of the noise distribution so that we can
calibrate those in the estimation. We are interested in ￿2
v and ￿v. In this simple exercise, we
make use of the probability answers in the core questionnaire (p0i;p10i) and the probability
answers in the experimental module (pM0i;pM10i), and we ignore rounding.


























































~ ￿i + vM10i.
By assumption, the noise components are jointly normally distributed, and they are
uncorrelated across core questionnaire and the experimental module.
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C.3.1 Moment conditions 1 and 2
Compare the inverse normal of the core and module answers to the same probability question
















































~ ￿i ￿ 0:1
~ ￿i
+ v10i ￿












C.3.2 Moment conditions 3 and 4
Similar comparisons across questions (p0 and pM10 or p10 and pM0) yield moments that are
similar to (38) and (39), but they also include the subjective beliefs about the standard













































































68C.3.3 Moment condition 5
Compare the adjacent probability answers in the core questionnaire (p0i;p10i) and take ex-







































In principle, one can do this for the answers from the experimental module, (pM0i;pM10i).
Because of low number of observations in the experimental module, we do not make use of
that comparison.
C.3.4 Estimation of ￿ and ￿2
v by Minimum Distance
In principle, this is a simple Minimum Distance problem with ￿ve moment conditions ((38)
through (42)) in three parameters
￿
￿2





. Of these three parameters, we are
interested in two, (￿2
v, and ￿v).
The ￿rst two moment conditions allow for a Minimum Distance estimation of ￿2
v, while
the ￿fth moment, together with the third and the fourth moments, allows for a Minimum
Distance estimation of ￿v. To see the latter, consider the di⁄erence (40) ￿ (42), and the







































Unfortunately, we do not observe pbr
0i and pbr
10i only their survey response versions that
are rounded versions for almost all respondents. We address rounding in the likelihood
estimation is by interval regressions, which is consistent under any rounding model (as long
as rounding is within the pre-de￿ned intervals). In this simple exercise, we assume away




However, an important practical consequence of rounding is the prevalence of answers at
0 and 1, and ￿￿1 (p) is not de￿ned for p = 0 or p = 1. In this simple exercise we opted for
69an ad-hoc solution replacing p = 0 to p = 0+" and p = 1 to p = 1￿", respectively. Various
values for " were considered (0.05, 0.025, 0.01, and 0.005), and we present the results as a
function of those values.
We have four equations in two unknowns, with the ￿rst two and second two equations
being symmetric in p0 and p10 (or their counterparts in the experimental module). This
symmetry implies that the optimum Minimum Distance estimator has identity weights under
the structure of our model.
The estimation results are the following.
Table C1. Estimated variance and correlation of survey noise.
Results of the Minimum Distance exercise by values of the auxiliary parameter "
" = 0:050 " = 0:025 " = 0:010 " = 0:005
￿v 0:96 1:05 1:17 1:26
￿v 0:61 0:61 0:61 0:60
These results should be viewed as very crude approximations because they ignore round-
ing (we substituted in the actual answers p for the hypothetical, before-rounding answers
pbr) and because they handle boundary values in a very ad-hoc way. The estimates of ￿v
seem robust to our handling the boundary problem, but the estimates of ￿v are not.
C.3.5 Estimation of ￿ and ￿2
v by Minimum Distance with covariates
The likelihood function and the estimator for (^ ￿i; ^ ￿i) conditions on observed covariates (Xi)
as well as the observed answers to the stock market probability questions (pi). The variance
and correlation coe¢ cient of the noise variables (v0i;v10i) may be di⁄erent if conditioned on
those covariates.20
In this subsection we present estimates of the noise parameters that use moment condi-
tions conditional on covariates. In practice, we repeated the Minimum Distance exercise de-
scribed above, but instead of the inverse of the observed (and "-adjusted) variables ￿￿1 (p0i)
etc. we used their residuals after having regressed on all covariates (Xi). The results are in
table C2.
20Tables B6 through B10 in the Online Appendix B show that the observed noise features are not strongly
associated with covariates. That was the basis for our assumption of unbiased and homoskedastic noise.
However, even those weak associations may result in a conditional noise variance that is somewhat smaller
than the unconditional one, which may make a di⁄erence in the likelihood estimation procedure.
70Table C2. Estimated variance and correlation of survey noise, conditional on covariates.
Results of the Minimum Distance exercise by values of the auxiliary parameter "
" = 0:050 " = 0:025 " = 0:010 " = 0:005
￿v 0:95 1:04 1:15 1:24
￿v 0:42 0:42 0:43 0:44
71D Detailed estimation results from the structural econo-
metric model
D.1 Detailed estimates from the benchmark model
Table D1. Detailed structural estimates 2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low ￿xed at 0.15.
E[mu] P[sig=low] E[mu] P[sig=low] E[mu] P[sig=low]
probit coeff probit coeff probit coeff
Log lifetime earnings 0.005 -0.055 0.003 -0.053
[0.009] [0.048] [0.010] [0.058]
Education (years) -0.046 -0.309 -0.042 -0.294
[0.021]* [0.262] [0.021]* [0.291]
Cognitive score 0.003 -0.019 0.005 -0.009
[0.018] [0.179] [0.018] [0.197]
DB pension plan 0.01 -0.01 0.005 -0.009
[0.004]* [0.032] [0.004] [0.035]
DC pension plan 0.02 -0.121 0.017 -0.112
[0.014] [0.101] [0.014] [0.118]
Financial respondent 0.036 0.073 0.035 0.057
[0.020] [0.193] [0.020] [0.207]
Log risk tolerance 0.088 0.137 0.087 0.11
[0.027]** [0.239] [0.026]** [0.276]
Single female -0.158 -0.763 -0.145 -0.833
[0.033]** [0.234]** [0.034]** [0.257]**
Single male -0.076 -0.28 -0.061 -0.361
[0.030]* [0.238] [0.029]* [0.268]
Female in couple -0.108 -0.715 -0.112 -0.798
[0.028]** [0.235]** [0.031]** [0.305]**
Age 0.003 0.079 0.002 0.072
[0.004] [0.039]* [0.004] [0.045]
Black -0.072 -0.184 -0.041 -0.174
[0.034]* [0.269] [0.032] [0.267]
Hispanic 0 0.029 0.021 0.036
[0.039] [0.297] [0.039] [0.331]
Father professional 0.028 0.202 0.018 0.166
[0.021] [0.189] [0.020] [0.217]
Missing lifetime earnings 0.015 0.519 0.005 0.558
[0.020] [0.170]** [0.021] [0.189]**
Missing risk tolerance 0.023 0.32 0.018 0.314
[0.022] [0.212] [0.021] [0.235]
Missing father occupation 0.005 0.291 0.006 0.312
[0.025] [0.205] [0.024] [0.222]
Non-positive wealth -0.008 -0.623
[0.120] [1.107]
Medium wealth 0.015 -0.396
[0.025] [0.209]
Hugh wealth 0.068 -0.061
[0.030]* [0.296]
Zero financial wealth 0.02 0.272
[0.040] [0.353]
Medium financial wealth 0.024 -0.215
[0.027] [0.237]
High finacial wealth 0.049 -0.138
[0.031] [0.278]
Sunshine optimism 0.04 0.038
[0.016]* [0.015]*
Pessimism in economic outlook -0.206 -0.182
[0.041]** [0.038]**
Depressive symptomes -0.018 -0.011
[0.010] [0.009]
Missing sunshine -0.034 -0.033
[0.031] [0.030]
Missing economic pessimism -0.038 -0.036
[0.038] [0.038]
Fraction fifty answers -3.724
[1.025]**
Constant -0.009 -0.716 -0.148 -3.871 -0.052 -0.76





Log lifetime earnings 0.128*** 0.109*** 0.000 -0.003
[0.027] [0.026] [0.008] [0.008]
Education (years) 0.102*** 0.075*** 0.011** 0.008
[0.013] [0.013] [0.005] [0.005]
Cognitive score 0.214*** 0.143*** 0.002 -0.009
[0.035] [0.035] [0.014] [0.014]
DB pension plan 0.017 0.108 -0.020 -0.012
[0.066] [0.069] [0.024] [0.024]
DC pension plan 0.097 0.079 0.006 0.004
[0.064] [0.065] [0.021] [0.021]
Financial respondent -0.071** -0.152*** -0.029*** -0.040***
[0.035] [0.038] [0.010] [0.011]
Log risk tolerance 0.072 -0.127 0.048* 0.030
[0.082] [0.086] [0.028] [0.029]
Single female -0.344*** 0.067 -0.023 0.009
[0.072] [0.093] [0.029] [0.035]
Single male -0.292*** -0.098 -0.022 -0.005
[0.087] [0.092] [0.034] [0.035]
Female in couple -0.011 0.280*** 0.010 0.029
[0.039] [0.060] [0.013] [0.020]
Age -0.013 -0.016 0.006 0.006*
[0.010] [0.010] [0.004] [0.004]
Black -0.728*** -0.582*** 0.034 0.057
[0.087] [0.090] [0.045] [0.046]
Hispanic -0.715*** -0.723*** -0.008 -0.004
[0.125] [0.124] [0.065] [0.063]
Father professional 0.162** 0.094 0.002 -0.003
[0.074] [0.075] [0.023] [0.023]
Constant -1.452** -1.066 0.110 0.060
[0.690] [0.724] [0.276] [0.282]
Observations 3323 3323 974 974
Log likelihood -1078 -1049 -129 -128
Standard errors are clustered at the household level
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Probit coefficients Truncated regression coefficients
Pr(S=1) E(s|s>0)
73D.2 Results for ￿nancial respondents
Table D3. Relevant heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. Estimates from the structural model
Financial respondents, 2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low ￿xed at 0.15.
Model w/o covariates Model with covariates
Point estimate SE￿ Point estimate SE￿
Population average of ~ ￿ ￿0:048 0:011 ￿0:038 0:056
Population standard deviation of ~ ￿ 0:147 0:010 0:202 0:094
Population average of ~ ￿ 0:170 0:002 0:449 0:086
￿Bootstrap standard errors
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Financial respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Table is analogous to table 2 in the main text
74Table D4. Estimated mean of the structural parameters of stock market beliefs
in various subpopulations. HRS 2002
Financial respondents, 2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low ￿xed at 0.15.
Average ^ ￿i Average ^ ￿i
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:134 0:434
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings ￿0:078 0:481
Education college or more 0:061 0:461
Education high school or less ￿0:074 0:469
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:140 0:437
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:092 0:471
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:042 0:474
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity ￿0:128 0:455
Father was manager or professional 0:047 0:442
Father had other occupation ￿0:021 0:477
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:033 0:437
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance ￿0:141 0:504
Entire sample of ￿nancial respondents ￿0:020 0:468
Total number of observations 2;313 2;313
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Financial respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
^ ￿i and ^ ￿i are the subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the one-year ahead stock return, predicted value
Table is analogous to table 3 in the main text
75Table D5. Subjective stock market beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin.
Financial respondents, 2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low ￿xed at 0.15.
Pr(si > 0), partial e⁄ects E (sijsi > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
^ ￿i 0:862 0:355
(0.097)￿￿ (0.129)￿￿
^ ￿i ￿0:158 0:170
(0.115) (0.146)
Log lifetime earnings 0:031 0:019 ￿0:003 ￿0:008
(0.008)￿￿ (0.007)￿￿ (0.008) (0.008)
Education 0:037 0:029 0:010 0:008
(0.004)￿￿ (0.004)￿￿ (0.06)￿￿ (0.007)
Cognitive capacity 0:060 0:039 ￿0:002 ￿0:013
(0.013)￿￿ (0.013)￿￿ (0.018) (0.018)
Log risk tolerance 0:015 ￿0:064 0:049 0:028
(0.030) (0.030)￿ (0.035) (0.036)
Single female ￿0:132 0:025 ￿0:032 0:001
(0.025)￿￿ (0.034) (0.031) (0.042)
Single male ￿0:108 ￿0:034 ￿0:028 ￿0:014
(0.029)￿￿ (0.031) (0.032) (0.038)
Female in couple ￿0:026 0:101 ￿0:003 0:018
(0.026) (0.033)￿￿ (0.032) (0.039)
African American ￿0:218 ￿0:155 0:036 0:058
(0.027)￿￿ (0.028)￿￿ (0.044) (0.045)
Hispanic ￿0:210 ￿0:162 ￿0:004 0:002
(0.043)￿￿ (0.042)￿￿ (0.067) (0.064)
Other variables YES YES YES YES
Table analogous to table 4 in main text. Probit models (1) and (2); truncated regression models (3) and (4).
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Financial respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped for models (2).and (4); ￿￿ signi￿cant at 1%; ￿ signi￿cant at 5%
76D.3 Results with freely estimated 2-point distributions for ~ ￿
Table D6. Relevant heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. Estimates from the structural model
2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low point estimated as well.
Model w/o covariates Model with covariates
Point estimate SE￿ Point estimate SE￿
Population average of ~ ￿ ￿0:054 0:015 ￿0:036 0:010
Population standard deviation of ~ ￿ 0:210 0:027 0:178 0:013
Population average of ~ ￿ 0:516 0:055 0:165 0:011
￿Bootstrap standard errors
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. All respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Table is analogous to table 2 in the main text
77Table D7. Estimated mean of the structural parameters of stock market beliefs
in various subpopulations. HRS 2002
2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low point estimated as well.
Average ^ ￿i Average ^ ￿i
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:703 0:164
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings ￿0:004 0:164
Education college or more 0:054 0:164
Education high school or less ￿0:041 0:164
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:071 0:164
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:068 0:165
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:041 0:164
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity ￿0:071 0:163
Father was manager or professional 0:042 0:164
Father had other occupation ￿0:008 0:164
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:021 0:164
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance ￿0:055 0:164
Entire sample respondents ￿0:036 0:164
Total number of observations 3;314 3;314
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. All respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
^ ￿i and ^ ￿i are the subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the one-year ahead stock return, predicted value
Table is analogous to table 3 in the main text
78Table D8. Subjective stock market beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin.
2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low point estimated as well.
Pr(si > 0), partial e⁄ects E (sijsi > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
^ ￿i 0:712 2:283
(0.080)￿￿ (0.265)￿￿
^ ￿i ￿11:62 ￿37:2
(13.95) (44.7)
Log lifetime earnings 0:041 0:037 0:000 0:121
(0.008)￿￿ (0.008)￿￿ (0.008) (0.027)￿￿
Education 0:033 0:026 0:011 0:080
(0.004)￿￿ (0.004)￿￿ (0.05)￿￿ (0.013)￿￿
Cognitive capacity 0:069 0:054 0:002 0:176
(0.011)￿￿ (0.013)￿￿ (0.014) (0.037)
Log risk tolerance 0:023 ￿0:008 0:049 ￿0:027
(0.026) (0.027)￿ (0.029) (0.084)
Single female ￿0:111 ￿0:033 ￿0:023 ￿0:107
(0.027)￿￿ (0.027) (0.029) (0.083)
Single male ￿0:093 ￿0:051 ￿0:022 ￿0:164
(0.029)￿￿ (0.028) (0.034) (0.090)
Female in couple ￿0:003 0:050 0:006 0:161
(0.012) (0.018)￿￿ (0.013) (0.056)￿￿
African American ￿0:233 ￿0:204 0:034 ￿0:655
(0.027)￿￿ (0.028)￿￿ (0.045) (0.089)￿￿
Hispanic ￿0:229 ￿0:227 ￿0:008 ￿0:729￿￿
(0.024)￿￿ (0.038)￿￿ (0.065) (0.125)
Other variables YES YES YES YES
Table analogous to table 4 in main text. Probit models (1) and (2); truncated regression models (3) and (4).
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. All respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped for models (2).and (4); ￿￿ signi￿cant at 1%; ￿ signi￿cant at 5%
79D.4 Results with including all the belief-speci￿c right hand-side
variables (z) in all models with the other covariates (x)
Table D9. Relevant heterogeneity in stock market beliefs. Estimates from the structural model
2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low point ￿xed to 0.15. z￿ and z￿ are always included with x
Model w/o covariates Model with covariates
Point estimate SE￿ Point estimate SE￿
Population average of ~ ￿ ￿0:066 0:018 ￿0:046 0:021
Population standard deviation of ~ ￿ 0:197 0:019 0:213 0:036
Population average of ~ ￿ 0:576 0:077 0:524 0:089
￿Bootstrap standard errors
Sample: HRS 2002, 55 to 64 years old ￿nancial respondents (partner is also 55 to 64)
Table is analogous to table 2 in the main text
80Table D10. Estimated mean of the structural parameters of stock market beliefs
in various subpopulations. HRS 2002
2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low point ￿xed to 0.15. z￿ and z￿ are always included with x
Average ^ ￿i Average ^ ￿i
Top 25 per cent of lifetime earnings 0:065 0:546
Bottom 25 per cent of lifetime earnings ￿0:092 0:535
Education college or more 0:042 0:539
Education high school or less ￿0:090 0:532
Has DC pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:073 0:540
Has DB pension (top 25% lifetime earnings) 0:049 0:576
Top 25 per cent of cognitive capacity 0:024 0:551
Bottom 25 per cent of cognitive capacity ￿0:132 0:509
Father was manager or professional 0:030 0:520
Father had other occupation ￿0:046 0:548
Top 25 per cent of risk tolerance 0:011 0:512
Bottom 25 per cent of risk tolerance ￿0:142 0:562
Financial respondent in couple 0:032 0:511
Non-￿nancial respondent in couple ￿0:049 0:556
Entire sample ￿0:038 0:537
Total number of observations 3;314 3;314
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. Respondents of age 55 through 64 (partner also 55-64)
^ ￿i and ^ ￿i: subjective mean and subjective standard deviation of the one-year ahead stock return, predicted value
Table is analogous to table 3 in the main text
81Table D11. Subjective stock market beliefs and stockholding at the extensive margin.
2-point distribution for ~ ￿, low point ￿xed to 0.15. z￿ and z￿ are always included with x
Pr(si > 0), partial e⁄ects E (sijsi > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
^ ￿i 0:608 0:240
(0.095)￿￿ (0.117)￿
^ ￿i ￿0:071 0:240
(0.096) (0.131)
Log lifetime earnings 0:037 0:033 ￿0:000 ￿0:003
(0.008)￿￿ (0.008)￿￿ (0.009) (0.012)
Education 0:030 0:023 0:009 0:007
(0.004)￿￿ (0.004)￿￿ (0.05) (0.005)
Cognitive capacity 0:054 0:042 ￿0:002 ￿0:011
(0.011)￿￿ (0.012)￿￿ (0.015) (0.015)
Log risk tolerance 0:026 ￿0:025 0:045 0:034
(0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Single female ￿0:088 0:015 ￿0:017 0:010
(0.023)￿￿ (0.032) (0.029) (0.037)
Single male ￿0:079 ￿0:030 ￿0:024 ￿0:021
(0.029)￿￿ (0.031) (0.035) (0.038)
Female in couple 0:005 0:078 0:017 0:018
(0.013) (0.020)￿￿ (0.013) (0.024)
African American ￿0:233 ￿0:190 0:028 0:047
(0.026)￿￿ (0.030)￿￿ (0.045) (0.046)
Hispanic ￿0:220 ￿0:216 ￿0:005 ￿0:006
(0.039)￿￿ (0.040)￿￿ (0.063) (0.061)
Other variables YES YES YES YES
Table analogous to table 4 in main text. Probit models (1) and (2); truncated regression models (3) and (4).
Sample: Health and Retirement Study, wave 2002. All respondents, age 55-64 (age of spouse also 55-64)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; bootstrapped for models (2).and (4); ￿￿ signi￿cant at 1%; ￿ signi￿cant at 5%
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